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1. INTRODUCTION
By George M. Low
Manned Spacecraft Center
On July 20, 1969, man first set foot on another planet. This "giant leap for man-
kind" represented one of the greatest engineering achievements of all time. This ar-
ticle and the others in this document describe and discuss some of the varied tasks
behind this achievement.
We will limit ourselves to those tasks that were the direct responsibility of the
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: spacecraft development, mission design and mission
planning, flight crew operations, and flight operations. We will describe spacecraft
design principles, the all-important spacecraft test activities, and the discipline that
evolved in the control of spacecraft changes and the closeout of spacecraft anomalies;
and we will discuss how we determined the best series of flights to lead to a lunar
landing at the earliest possible time, how these flights were planned in detail, the
techniques used in establishing flight procedures and carrying out flight operations,
and, finally, crew training and simulation activities -- the activities that led to a per-
fect flight execution by the astronauts.
In short, we will describe three of the basic ingredients of the success of Apollo:
spacecraft hardware that is most reliable, flight missions that are extremely well
planned and executed, and flight crews that are superbly trained and skilled. (We will
not discuss two equally important aspects of Apollo -- the launch vehicles and launch
operations. These elements, the responsibility of the NASA Marshall Space Flight
Center and the NASA Kennedy Space Center, go beyond the scope of this series of
articles. )
SPACECRAFT DEVELOPMENT
Four aspects of spacecraft development stand out: design, test, control of
changes, and interpretation of discrepancies. We can begin with them.
Spacecraft Design
The principles of manned spacecraft design involve a combination of aircraft-
design practice and elements of missile-design technology: Build it simple and then
double up on many components or systems so that if one fails the other will take over.
Examples are ablative thrust chambers that do not require regenerative cooling; hy-
pergolic propellants that do not require an ignition source; three fuel cells, where one
alone could bring the spacecraft back from the moon; series/parallel redundancy in
valves, regulators, capacitors, and diodes so that neither an "open" nor a "closed"
failure will be catastrophic.
Another important design rule, which we have not discussed as often as we
should, reads: Minimize functional interfaces between complex pieces of hardware.
In this way, two organizations can work on their own hardware relatively independently.
Examples in Apollo include the interfaces between the spacecraft and launch vehicle
and between the command module and the lunar module. Only some 100 wires link the
Saturn launch vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft, and most of these have to do with the
emergency detection system. The reason thatthis number could not be even smaller
is twofold: Redundant circuits are employed, and the electrical power always comes
from the module or stage where a function is to be performed. For example, the
closing of relays in the launch vehicle could, in an automatic abort mode, fire the
spacecraft escape motor. But the electrical power to do this, by design, originates in
the spacecraft batteries. The main point is that a single man can fully understand this
interface and can cope with all the effects of a change on either side of the interface.
If there had been 10 times as many wires, it probably would have taken a hundred (or
a thousand?) times as many people to handle the interface.
Another design question for manned flight concerns theuse of man himself. Here
again, we find no simple rule as to how man should interface with his machine. Gen-
erally, tedious, repetitive tasks are best performed automatically; and selection of
the best data source to use, selection of control modes, and switching between redun-
dant systems are tasks best performed by the pilot. In Apollo, the trend has been to
rely more and more on automatic modes as systems experience has been gained. For
example, computer programs for rendezvous were reworked to require far less oper-
ator input than had originally been planned, but the entire rendezvous sequence was de-
signed so that the pilot could always monitor the automatic system's performance and
apply a backup solution if deviations were noted. A tremendous amount of time and
effort was spent to determine how the crew could best decide which data source to use
and which of many redundant systems to rely on. This was always a basic mission-
design consideration.
The concept of inflight maintenance was discarded entirely as being impractical
for flights with the specific purpose and duration of Apollo. In its place, more telem-
etry was added and full advantage was taken of the ground's ability to assess system
performance, predict trends, and compare data with preflight test experience.
Apollo Test Activities
The single most important factor leading to the high degree of reliability of the
Apollo spacecraft was the tremendous depth and breadth of the test activity.
There are two general categories of tests: (1) those made on a single prototype
device (or on a few devices) to demonstrate that the design is proper and will perform
properly in all environments and (2) those made on each flight item to assure that
there are no manufacturing errors and that the item will function as intended. Both
categories apply to individual parts, components, subsystems, systems, and entire
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spacecraft. The first category includes development testing early in the design cycle
and the very formal certification or qualification tests performed on test articles iden-
tical to the flight system. The second category covers acceptance testing.
Instead of reviewing the entire development and qualification test program, we
can focus on only those tests involving complete spacecraft or boilerplates, as listed
in table 1-I. Each of these tests taught us more about our spacecraft -- their strengths
and weaknesses. As a result of the thermal vacuum tests, the spacecraft withstood the
translunar and lunar environments without a single thermal problem. Passive thermal-
control modes were developed that required minimum crew inputs and gave a perfect
thermal balance. The land-impact tests demonstrated that the command module could
survive an emergency land landing if wind velocity stayed within certain limits. These
tests also led to the design of a new impact-attenuation strut for the astronaut couch.
The strut allowed us to increase the permissible launch wind speed and thereby gave
us more flexibility in an otherwise constrained launch window. Other tests brought
equally significant results.
TABLE 1-I. - DEVELOPMENT AND QUALIFICATION TESTS
[ Full-scale spacecraft testing]
Escape motor flight tests ............................ 7
Parachute drop tests ............................... 40
Command module land impact tests ....................... 48
Command module water impact tests ...................... 52
Lunar module structural drop tests ....................... 16
Lunar module complete drop tests ....................... 5
Command and service module acoustic/vibration tests, hr .......... 15.5
Lunar module acoustic/vibration tests, hr ................... 3.5
Command and service module modal survey testing, hr ............ 277.6
Lunar module modal survey testing, hr ..................... 351.4
Command and service module thermal vacuum tests, hr ............ 773
Lunar module thermal vacuum tests, hr .................... 2652
Service module propulsion-system tests, min ................. 1474.5
Ascent-stage propulsion-system tests, min ................ 153
Descent-stage propulsion-system tests, min .................. 220
Most important of all,the tests gave us a tremendous amount of time and experi-
ence on the spacecraft and their systems. Such experience -- together with a detailed
analysis of allprevious failures, discrepancies, and anomalies -- led us to the con-
clusion thatwe were ready to fly a lunar orbit with Apollo 8 and that we were ready to
make a lunar landing with Apollo II.
Acceptance testing played an equally important role. This testing starts with
piece parts. Although Apollo was late in applying this rule, I believe that screened
and burned-in electronic parts must be made a firm requirement. Next, each com-
ponent, or black box, is tested before itis delivered, and again before itis installed
in the spacecraft. Then, factory testingof the complete spacecraft begins. First, the
wiring is wrung out, and individualsubsystems are tested as installed. Then, groups
of systems are jointlytested. Finally, the complete spacecraft, with all of its sys-
tems functioning, is run in an integrated test. All normal, emergency, and redundant
modes are verified.
After delivery to the launch site, similar (when practical, identical)tests are
performed. A major test at Cape Kennedy is a manned altitude-chamber run of each
spacecraft. The finalacceptance test, of course, is the countdown itself.
A most important facet of acceptance testing is environmental acceptance testing.
The primary purpose of acceptance vibration testing and acceptance thermal testing is
to find workmanship errors. To do this, the environment has to be severe enough to
find the fault (e. g., a cold-solder joint), yet not so severe as to weaken or fatigue the
component. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 show the levels selected for these tests in Apollo.
These levels were picked on the basis of experience in Gemini and other programs.
Each component type, of course, had to pass qualification tests under even more se-
vere environments. Nevertheless, our environmental acceptance tests sometimes un-
covered design faults (as opposed to workmanship faults) that had been missed in the
qualification tests. The reason was that a single qualification test may have missed a
marginal condition, which the large number of acceptance tests could catch.
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We also considered environmental acceptance tests of complete spacecraft, but
decided against this because the environment on most components, as mounted in the
spacecraft, is not severe enough to bring out workmanship faults. The vibration levels
on many components are one or two orders of magnitude less than those given in fig-
ure 1-1. (This conclusion would not be true for smaller, more compact spacecraft. )
Temperatures in the spacecraft generally remain constant because most electronic
components are mounted on cold plates.
Figures 1-3 and 1-4 summarize the results of the Apollo environmental accept-
ance test program. Note that 5 percent of all components failed under vibration, and
10.3 percent of all components did not pass the thermal testing. Remember that these
components were otherwise ready for installation in the spacecraft. By category, the
failure modes look like those listed in table 1-II. If these tests had not been per-
formed, and if these failures had occurred in flight, we very likely would still be wait-
ing for the first manned lunar landing.
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Figure 1-3. - Results of vibration accept- Figure 1-4.- Results of thermal accept-
ance tests for 11 447 tests of 166 dif- ance tests for 3685 tests of 127 different
ferent components, components.
TABLE 1-II.- HISTORY OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ACCEPTANCE TEST FAILURES
Mode Percent failed
Electrical
Mechanical
Contamination
Other
Total
57.3
27.4
11.5
3.8
100
Control of Changes
If the design has been verified and if
a thorough test program has been com-
pleted, it should not be necessary to make
any changes. Of course, this idealized
situation does not exist in any program
like Apollo where design, test, and flight
often overlap and must be carried out at
the same time. Changes may be required
as a result of test failures, or another
look at the design may identify a situation
that could lead to a failure or to the inabil-
ity to react to failure. Sometimes a more
detailed definition of flight missions or op-
erational use of the hardware itself leads
to a requirement for change.
Since it is not possible to eliminate all changes,we haveto start with the prem-
ise that any changewill be undesirable. That is, a changewill void all previous test
and flight experience and, no matter how simple, may haveramifications .far beyond
those identified by the initial engineering analysis.
Because changes must be made nevertheless, it becomes important to understand
and to control them, no matter how small. In Apollo, we handled all changes through
a series of Configuration Control Panels and a Configuration Control Board. The pan-
els considered minor hardware changes early in the development cycle, as well as
crew procedures and all computer programs. The Board considered more significant
hardware changes, all hardware changes after spacecraft delivery, and procedures or
software changes that could affect schedules or missions.
The Apollo Spacecraft Configuration Control Board met 90 times between
June 1967 and July 1969, considered 1697 changes, approved 1341, and rejected 356.
We had a low rejection rate because proposed changes were reviewed before they came
to the Board, and only those deemed mandatory for flight safety were brought before it.
The Board is chaired by the Program Manager, who also makes the final decision on
all changes. The Board includes the directors of all major technical elements of the
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center and the contractors' program managers.
We considered changes large and small. An example of a large change is the
new spacecraft hatch that was incorporated after the fire. However, we reviewed in
equal technical detail a relatively small change, such as a small piece of plastic to go
inside the astronaut's ballpoint pen.
The Board was established to discipline the control of changes; but it was found
to serve a much larger purpose: It constituted a decisionmaking forum for spacecraft
developer and user. In reaching our decisions, we had the combined inputs of key
people representing hardware development, flight operations, flight crews, safety,
medicine, and science.
I have recently reviewed the results of the 90 Board meetings that preceded
Apollo 11. Even with hindsight, I find few, if any, Board decisions that I would make
differently today.
Closeout of Failures
Throughout Apollo, many discrepancies or failures occurred daily. The rela-
tionship may have been a close one (i. e., failures actually took place during testing of
the next spacecraft to fly) or it might have been remote (i. e., a component identical to
one used on Apollo failed on another program). In either instance the result was the
same: The failure had to be understood and, if applicable, some corrective action
taken. This might involve design change, reinspection, or perhaps procedural change.
Iwill confine my remarksto anomalies that occurred during the first five manned
Apollo flights. The number of anomalies for each mission are given in table 1-IH.
Note that, even though each of the flights was completely successful and met all its ob-
jectives, the number of anomalies went quite high. Perhaps this is the best proof of
the validity of the Apollo design concept: The spacecraft were designed for mission
success.
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TABLE 1-III.- APOLLO FLIGHT
ANOMALIES
Spacecraft
Apollo 7
Apollo 8
Apollo 9
Apollo 10
Apollo 11
Number of anomalies
Command and
service module
22
8
14
23
9
Lunar module
12
15
13
The closeout of these flight failures
had to be done in the time available be-
tween the completion of one flight and the
start of the next -- a period usually only
about 6 weeks long. Yet even these
6 weeks were not fully available, because
hypergolic propellants were loaded into the
spacecraft a month before launch, there-
after severely limiting ability to make
spacecraft changes and to perform neces-
sary retesting. Nevertheless, each of the
failures listed in table 1-III was satisfac-
torily closed out before the next flight.
Let us look at just one example. On
Apollo 10, during several of the lunar or-
bits, a critical fuel-cell temperature
started to oscillate significantly, as shown
in figure 1-5. Normally, this temperature
is steady, between 155 ° and 165 ° F. The
oscillations encountered on Apollo 10
triggered the spacecraft alarm system, but otherwise were not detrimental. Yet, un-
less we understood their cause, we could not be sure that they would always be limited
as they were in Apollo 10 and hence that they would not lead to a fuel-cell failure.
Our investigation revealed that small, isolated disturbances in fuel-cell temper-
ature were often present, as figure 1-6 shows. Pratt & Whitney, North American, and
NASA then performed a detailed stability analysis of the fuel-cell system, transfer
functions were experimentally determined, and finally a complete fuel cell test was run
to verify the results of the analysis. This work demonstrated that small, isolated dis-
turbances could trigger an instability if the power loading ran sufficiently high and the
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Figure 1-5. - Apollo 10 fuel-cell tempera-
ture oscillations as they originally ap-
peared in flight.
Figure 1-6.- Disturbance of Apollo 10
fuel-cell temperature as it was iden-
tified in the laboratory.
temperature sufficiently low. The analysis also showedthat the amplitude of the os-
cillations would alwaysbe limited as it was in Apollo 10. With this information, it was
possible to devise procedures to eliminate the oscillations, shouldthey occur.
The solution as described here probably soundssimple. Yet, a similar task,
formulated as a research assignment, might havetaken a year or more to complete.
Here, closeout of the failure was donein weeks.
The fuel-cell anomalywas only one exampleof a discrepancy. The total task
handling all flight anomalies--was enormous; yet, it was completed before each
flight.
FLIGHT MISSIONS
It is difficult to describe, to those not directly involved in the Apollo Program,
just how much work went into operational activities. First, we had to decide the kinds
of mission to be flown: What would be the best series of missions to achieve a suc-
cessful manned lunar landing at the earliest time? Then these missions had to be
planned in detail: How should each mission be designed to meet the largest number of
operational and hardware objectives, even in the event of unplanned events? (Opera-
tional objectives are concerned with guidance, navigation, trajectory control, rendez-
vous, etc. ; hardware objectives are concerned with the verification of each system or
subsystem in the flight environment. ) Finally, plans had to be made for the execution
of the mission: Detailed rules were evolved for every imaginable contingency; the
proper flight-control displays were defined to permit instantaneous reaction to emer-
gencies, and countless hours were spent in simulations of every conceivable situation.
Mission Definition
Early in 1967 the situation was as follows. Many development flights had taken
place to test the launch-escape system under extreme conditions, to test the command
module heat-protection system at speeds halfway between earth-orbital and lunar-
reentry velocities, and to put the guidance and propulsion systems through their pre-
liminary paces. However, Saturn V had not yet been flown, reentry at lunar-return
speeds had not yet been made, the lunar module had not yet been flown, and man had
not yet been in space in Apollo hardware.
The flight-test program shown in figure 1-7 was then evolved through an iterative
and flexible process that was changed as time went on to take the best advantage of
knowledge about mission operations and hardware availability at any given time. The
basic principle in planning these flights was to gain the maximum new experience
(toward the goal of a lunar landing) on each flight without stretching either the equip-
ment or the people beyond their ability to absorb the next step.
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Too small a step would have involved the risk that is always inherent in manned
flight, without any significant gain -- without any real progress toward the lunar land-
ing. Too large a step, on the other hand, might have stretched the system beyond the
capability and to the point where risks would have become excessive because the new
requirements in flight operations were more than people could learn and practice and
perfect in available time.
Apollo 4 and 6 saw the first flights of Saturn V. Apollo 4 was almost letter per-
fect. Yet a repeat flight was planned and, in retrospect, proved to be very important.
Serious defects in the Saturn propulsion system and in the spacecraft adapter, that
were not apparent on Apollo 4, caused major failures on Apollo 6. These failures led
to an extensive ground-test program and to hardware changes before the next flight of
the launch vehicle. Apollo 4 also served to qualify the spacecraft heat shield under
severe simulated lunar reentry conditions; the flight showed that the design was
conservative.
Apollo 5 was an unmanned flight of the lunar module. The lunar module guidance
system, both propulsion systems, and the all-important staging sequence between the
ascent and descent stages functioned well.
The first manned flight of the command and service module came in October 1968,
with Apollo 7. The spacecraft performed beyond all expectations in this 11-day flight.
Each of the command and service module systems (except the docking system) was put
through its paces without a significant malfunction.
The decision to fly into lunar orbit on Apollo 8 came relatively late. It was
made, ona tentative basis, in August 1968. At that time, the test experience with the
commandand service modulehad beenvery good. The lunar moduleschedule, on the
other hand, was slipping; and the first manned lunar module exhibited the normal
"first ship" difficulties during checkoutat the NASAKennedySpaceCenter. Also, a
detailed analysis of results from the unmannedLunar Orbiter Program had shownthat
navigation around the moonwould present manyunexpectedcomputationaldifficulties.
For all of these reasons, it was decided that Apollo 8 should be a CSM-alone
lunar-orbit flight. This decision was reaffirmed with the successof Apollo 7, and the
die was cast for making man's first flight to the moonin December 1968.
In Apollo 9, both spacecraft, the lunar module and the command and service
module, were tested together for the first time. First, all of the lunar module sys-
tems were tested in mannedflight. Then methodsfor the following spacecraft opera-
tions were worked out and verified: communicationsbetweentwo spacecraft and the
ground; tracking, guidance, andnavigation; and rendezvousand docking. Also on
Apollo 9, the extravehicular mobility unit (the lunar spacesuit and its life-support
system) was tested in the actual spaceenvironment.
After Apollo 9 another decision hadto be made: Were we then ready for a lunar
landing, or was the step too big? We decided that we faced too many remaining
unknowns: performance of the lunar module in the deep-spaceenvironment, communi-
cations with the lunar moduleat lunar distances, combinedoperations with two space-
craft around the moon, rendezvousaround the moon, and, of course, the lunar descent,
landing, surface operations, and ascent. In lieu of a landing, we planned to do as
manyof these tasks as possible onApollo 10without actually touchingdownon the sur-
face of the moon.
The entire series of flights represented a step-by-step buildup, with eachstep
leading closer to a lunar-landing ability. Our intent was to use the procedures devel-
opedon oneflight on each subsequentmission. Changeswere allowed only if they were
essential for flight safety or mission success. By meansof this buildup, we minimized
the remaining tasks (descent, landing, surface operations, andascent) that could be
worked out only on the actual landing mission. The Apollo 11 crew was able to concen-
trate on these remaining tasks, to work them out in detail, and to carry them out with
perfection.
Mission Planning and Execution
Once basic missions had been defined, each flight had to be planned in detail.
The mission planner tries to fit into each flight the maximum number of tests of the
hardware and the widest variety of operations. For example, he will develop a ren-
dezvous profile for a single earth-orbital flight that involves all of the normal and ab-
normal rendezvous conditions which might be encountered around the moon
rendezvous from above, rendezvous from below, rendezvous with the lunar module
active, rendezvous with the command and service module active, and rendezvous with
varying lighting conditions. At the same time, the mission planner will try to exer-
cise all of the propulsion systems and all of the navigation systems on both spacecraft.
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After mission plans come the mission techniques (byanother name, dataprior-
ity). Given two or three data sources (for trajectory control), which of the sources
shouldbe believed andwhich discarded? Limits for each system hadto be determined,
and logic flows for every conceivable situation hadto be developed.
Finally, the flightcontrollers take over. They had participated, of course, in
the mission-planning and mission-technique activities;but now they had to work out
each step of the flightand anticipate every emergency situationthat might arise. What
is the proper action when one fuel cellfails? What iftwo fail? The answers to thou-
sands of questions likethese had to be derived in terms of the specific mission phase.
A rendezvous radar failurebefore command and service module-lunar module separa-
tion dictates that the two vehicles should not be separated. The same failure after
separation allows the mission to be continued because the risk of rendezvous without
radar has already been incurred and will not increase in subsequent mission sequences.
Each of these events was documented as a mission rule long before the flight,and mis-
sion rules were placed under "configuration control," as was every other aspect of the
Apollo system.
Flight controllers also worked out the best formats for their real-time displays.
During the Apollo 11 descent to the surface of the moon, the flight controllers could
watch, with a delay of only 6 to l0 seconds, the functioning of nearly every onboard
system. They saw the rise in chamber pressure as the descent engine was throttled
up to full thrust, and they could determine that the throttle-down occurred at the proper
time. The flight controllers could also compare the descent trajectory from three
data sources -- two onboard guidance systems and the ground tracking system. With
this information, a flightcontroller on the ground could tellthe crew, nearly
250 000 miles away, to ignore the alarms from the onboard computer during the most
critical portion of the descent, because the system was guiding the spacecraft
correctly.
Many of the techniques used during the flight were developed during countless
hours of simulations. Simulation is a game of "what-if's. " What if the computer
fails ? What if the engine does not ignite? What if... ? The game is played over and
over again. The flight controllers do not know what situation they will face on the next
simulation. By the time of flight, they will have done simulations so often and they
will have worked together as a team so long, that they can cope with any situation that
arises.
Because the Apollo equipment has worked so well and because there have been so
few contingency situations, one could conclude that much of the planning, many of the
mission techniques, and much of the training were done in vain. But this is an incor-
rect conclusion. As a minimum, the state of readiness that evolved from these efforts
gave us the courage and the confidence to press on from one mission to the next. Also,
there were situations -- the computer alarms during the descent of Apollo ll and the
lightning discharge during the launch of Apollo 12 -- that might have led to an abort if
the team had been less well prepared and less ready to cope with the unexpected.
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FLIGHT CREWTRAINING
The first six Apollo manned flights carried 18 astronauts -- all professional pi-
lots, skilled and superbly trained. Altogether, they had flown on 18 flights in Mercury
and Gemini before they flew in an Apollo spacecraft. Five had flown twice before,
eight had flown once before, and five flew for the first time in Apollo.
Training for Apollo is not easy. Two highly sophisticated machines are involved,
each far more complex than those in Gemini. The astronauts had to become expert in
the workings of both spacecraft. They became computer programers and computer
operators, space navigators, guidance experts, propulsion engineers, fuel-cell-power
managers, environmental-control-system experts -- to mention but a few areas of ex-
pertise. Of course, they had to learn how to control and fly two spacecraft with vastly
different handling qualities under conditions of launch, translunar flight, lunar-orbit
flight, lunar landing, lunar launch, rendezvous, docking, transearth flight, and
reentry.
The astronauts used a variety of training devices -- high-performance airplanes
to stay alert and sharp; a special dynamic launch simulator to practice manual take-
over and abort modes; mission simulators to duplicate here on earth every spacecraft
function and display under all possible conditions; partial-gravity simulations under
water, in airplanes, and on a special servo-controlled device on the ground; a docking
trainer; and a flying lunar-landing training vehicle that has a jet engine to take out
five-sixths the gravity of earth so that the vehicle has the same flying characteristics
as the lunar module has on the moon.
The astronauts also needed plans and procedures. Flight plans spelled out each
step of the mission. Detailed "time lines" were developed for every function that had
to be performed, minute by minute. Crew procedures and checklists were an adjunct
to the flight plan. The step-by-step sequence for each spacecraft activity, each ma-
neuver, each propulsive burn was worked out well in advance and was used again and
again during practice and simulation.
Configuration control was as important in the astronaut training as in every other
category. Simulators had to look just like the spacecraft to be useful, and last-minute
spacecraft changes had to be incorporated in the simulators as well. Crew procedures
that had worked well on one flight could not be changed, through "crew preference, "
for the following flight.
Pete Conrad said that landing his Apollo 12 lunar module, after dust obscured
the landing point, was the most difficulttask he had ever performed. Ittook all of his
20 years of experience as a professional aviator, his previous work on two Gemini
flights,his training for Apollo, and his knowledge and confidence in the Apollo space-
craft systems to make that landing a success.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Spacecraft development, mission operations, and flight crew activities -- in re-
viewing these areas of Apollo, I see one overriding consideration that stands out above
all the others: Attention to detail. Painstaking attention to detail, coupled with a ded-
ication to get the job done well, by all people, at all levels, on every element of Apollo
led to the success of what must be one of the greatest engineering achievements of all
time -- man's first landing on the moon. The reports which follow amplify this
observation.
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.DESIGN PRINCIPLES STRESSING SIMPLICITY
By Kenneth S. KIeinknecht
Manned SpacecraftCenter
The shaping of reliable, safe Apollo spacecraft owes its success to specific
principles stressing the simplicity, both in originating and evaluating hardware designs.
The primary consideration governing the design of the Apollo system was that, if it
could be made so, no single failure should cause the loss of any crewmember, prevent
the successful continuation of the mission, or, in the event of a second failure in the
same area, prevent a successful abort of the mission.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
To implement this policy, the following specific principles were established to
guide Apollo engineers when they originated and evaluated hardware designs.
1. Use established technology.
2. Stress hardware reliability.
3. Comply with safety standards.
4. Minimize in/light maintenance and testing for failure isolation, and rely
instead on assistance from the ground.
5. Simplify operations.
6. Minimize interfaces.
7. Make maximum use of experience gained from previous manned-space-flight
programs.
Established technology was used for areas in which performance and reliability
goals had already been realized. Hardware design precluded, as much as possible,
the necessity to develop new components or techniques. When this policy could not be
met, procedures were established whereby management approved new development
requirements only after clear-cut plans for the development effort and a suitable
backup capability had been defined.
A primary criterion governing a particular system was whether or not the design
could achieve mission success without incurring risk of life or serious injury to the
crew. Numerical values for reliability standards and minimum mission objectives
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were established. Trade-off studies of designand performance were then madeto
define the necessary redundancy(including alternate or backupequipmentas well as
modesof operation) for meeting mission goals within the program constraints of time,
cost, and weight. Apollo engineersperformed not only comprehensivefailure mode and
effects analyses, but also single-point failure analyses. Througha series of iterative
design reviews, the engineers eliminated or minimized eachpotential failure point.
Safety considerations were emphasizedby selecting appropriate design features
and proven, qualified componentsandoperating principles. Integrated safety analyses
defined the interfaces betweensubsystems. Thus, safety problem areas were identified
for the combinedsystem. Failure modes considered included structural failures, rup-
tures, fuel leaks, hose-tubingfailures, electrical open-short, andfastener failures.
During Apollo spacecraft design andplanning, inflight maintenancewas carefully
considered, but the disadvantagesof this approachfar outweighedthe advantages. In
consideration of the duration of the Apollo missions, reliable performance could be
achievedthrough component,circuit, and system redundancy, since the subsystemsare
not required to operate over long periods of spacetravel or after being dormant for long
periods. The additional connectorsandtest points required for an inflight maintenance
also significantly degradedthe overall reliability of the system. Of lesser considera-
tion was the provisioning and stowageof the necessary spare parts within an already
limited volume.
With elimination of maintenanceandfailure isolation by the crew in flight, data
were madeavailable to allow the ground to troubleshoot, isolate the failure, andrecom-
mend corrective action. This reliance on the ground for troubleshooting hasproved
quite effective, since subsystemoperational specialists (flight controllers) anddesign
specialists (subsystemengineers) are available andfree to concentrate continuously on
the resolution of spacecraft problems. This practice also relieves the crew from a
training requirement of becoming intimately familiar with the detailed subsystem
design. In addition to havingcockpit display information relayed from the crew, the
ground hasapproximately 330data channelsthrough telemetry and approximately
1100groundor preflight checkoutdata channels.
Rapiddata storage, comparison, retrieval, andanalysis by computer complexes
within the Mission Control Center at the NASAMannedSpacecraft Center (fig. 2-1)
give the ground an enormousadvantageover the crew, which must continue to operate
the spacecraft, eat, andsleep ona fixed schedule. In addition, the groundhas complete
files of drawings and specifications available. The groundalso has simulators -- exact
functional duplicates of the flight spacecraft -- to evaluateflight problems and correc-
tive procedures.
The Apollo maintenanceconcept, althoughnot providing for inflight maintenance,
does permit removal and replacement of "black boxes" during preflight checkout. This
procedure does not require entering the box interior, a practice which could disturb
adjacentor related assemblies. Performance of the replaced equipmentmust be at
least equal to the required performance of the original system. To isolate faults at the
black-box level, test points are located in the subsystems. The engineers haveappro-
priate ground-checkoutequipmentfor fault isolation.
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Guidedby conceptsof simplified functional operation, Apollo engineers combined
off-the-shelf componentsinto integrated systems which performed so efficiently that
the crew was permitted to devote the majority of its time to the productive tasks of
scientific experimentation and data acquisition. Somedesign requirements, however,
resulted not so much in simple mechanismsas in extreme simplicity and reliability of
operation. Thus, one crewman, wearing a pressurized space suit, can perform all
critical spacecraft control functions.
To achieve a minimum of interfaces, subsystemdesignswere developedand
tested independentlyand later joined with other spacecraft subsystems. The final
Apollo configuration was the result of technological andweight constraints. The Apollo
external interfaces betweenthe launch complex andthe launch vehicle and the internal
interface betweenthe commandmodule andthe lunar module are defined in detail by
interface control documents, and havebeen carefully screenedto eliminate all but
essential functions, thus keeping vehicle interfaces to the minimum. For example,
there are only 36wires betweenthe lunar moduleand commandand service module and
only some 100wires betweenthe spacecraft and the launchvehicle.
To use the experiencegained from Project Mercury andthe Gemini Program,
engineers with operational backgroundfrom these programs were involved in all major
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Apollo design reviews. This procedure allowed incorporation of their knowledgeas the
Apollo design evolved. This involvement proved a key factor in producing spacecraft
that haveperformed superbly so far. Even the Apollo 13oxygentank rupture, by far
the most critical problem of anyApollo mission to date, wasovercome by relying on
preplannedemergencyprocedures andthe resourcefulness and ingenuity of the astro-
nautsand the ground support team.
DESIGN FEATURES
Apollo gains a measure of simplicity from features simple both in design and
operation, complex in design but simple to operate, or simple by being passive in func-
tion. The concept of simple design and simple operation is best illustrated by the
Apollo rocket-propulsion systems (fig. 2-2). The pressure feeding and redundant
valving guarantee the arrival of the propellant in the combustion chamber, where hyper-
golic reaction assures ignition. Ablative materials for chamber walls assure chamber
integrity while simplifying design greatly.
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The latching device for the crew
hatch, (fig. 2-3) illustrates a complex but
simply operated mechanism. Although the
device contains approximately 400parts,
it allows a crewman, with a single move-
ment of his arm, to open the command
module hatch in less than 10seconds.
Somedesign features are simple by
being passive (for instance, thermal con-
trol). Thermal coatings, ablative heat
shields, and insulation eliminate the elec-
trical power requirements of an active
system and necessitate only attitude ad-
justment to maintain spacecraft tempera-
tures within acceptabletolerances.
Apollo reaction-control systems, in
both the lunar moduleand the command
module, represent prime examples of Figure 2-3.- Commandmodule hatch.
redundancy. The command and lunar
modules have two parallel and independentsystems, either of which is able to
meet mission requirements.
Critical events initiated by pyrotechnic devices and the cooling of temperature-
sensitive subsystemsby the environmental control system (ECS)represent two exam-
ples of redundantpaths. In the caseof pyrotechnic devices, two separate wire runs
and initiators receive the sameevent signal. Likewise, the ECScontains two water/
glycol circulating plumbing loops, each having its own control system. Not all systems
serviced by the primary glycol loop canbe supportedby the secondarysystem, but
enoughcapability exists to return to earth safely.
For someof the critical systems, redundancyis not provided by duplication. For
example, the lunar module abort guidancesystem provides virtually the same ability
for delivering the lunar moduleback into orbit from the descent trajectory andfrom the
lunar surface that the primary guidancesystem does. However, the designsof the
abort andprimary guidancesystems, both hardware and software, are completely dif-
ferent. In at least one respect, this difference improves reliability by eliminating the
possibility of commondesign faults, particularly in the computer programs, although
this was not the basic reason for using this approach. In addition, some simultaneous
component failures of both systems can even be tolerated by adopting a more manual
mode of operation and using the remaining capability of each system.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Apollo design philosophy has resulted in a highly reliable spacecraft capable
of placing man on the moon and returning him to earth safely. Simple design practice,
coupled with stringent technical and administrative discipline, has achieved this end.
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The spacecraft (the commandand service module andthe lunar module), embodying
millions of functional parts, miles of wiring, andthousandsof weldedjoints, has
evolved into a truly operational spacetransportation system.
2O
. TESTING TO ENSURE MI SSION SUCCESS
By ScottH. Simpkinson
Manned SpacecraftCenter
All programs, once the overall objectives are fixed, must meet well-defined de-
sign goals, or management fails. However, this hard fact does not prevail in the world
of test. Theoretically, one no longer needs to test hardware or software, after devel-
oping a new concept, except occasionally to gather empirical data needed to operate the
equipment. Unfortunately, designs are not perfect, materials and processes often do
not work as the designers expect, manufacturing techniques sometimes inadvertently
alter the design, assembly procedures leave room for mistakes, engineering and devel-
opment tests do not necessarily provide all the required data, and, finally, substandard
workmanship and human error creep in.
All of these factors require attention at the outset of a program. Some factors,
such as human error, demand vigilance until delivery of the last item. Experience has
shown that only a well-balanced test program can instill confidence in the delivered
hardware and software for a space vehicle.
At the beginning of the Apollo Program, high priority went to setting up a program
for one-time qualification of a component or system design and to manufacturer execu-
tion of the program. All contracts contained specific clauses relating to qualification
tests. These tests provided a reasonable margin of safety, taking into account the ex-
pected environments the pieces would pass through during storage, transportation and
handling, ground-test duty cycles, and two-mission duty cycles. After the early un-
manned flight-test program had started, actual measurements of the launch environ-
ment led to adjustments in the qualification vibration levels. Equipment already tested
at too low an amplitude had to pass an additional (or delta) qualification test program.
Rigorous monitoring and careful failure reporting allowed correction of design and
process failures.
Even with this exacting qualification program, a number of experienced engineers
believed each flight item should have to pass some environmental testing before NASA
accepted it for installation and flight. Thus, nearly all functional components and sys-
tems underwent acceptance testing. However, the detailed test plans were left in the
hands of the individual designers and system engineers. During the early stages of the
Apollo Program, most components and systems were limited to a complete functional
bench test at room temperature and pressure and a survival test after a brief exposure
to random vibration in the axis suspected of being the most sensitive and at the expected
flight-power spectral density.
A few vendors, who were experienced on other critical military and NASA pro-
grams and who were supplying electronic components for the lunar module (LM), also
performed temperature-limit tests at their own discretion during buildup or during the
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final acceptancetests (or, in somecases, during both). Unfortunately, the expected
flight vibration levels were so low in manycases that these early environmental accept-
ance tests did not reveal errors of workmanship and manufacturing processes. Many
system manufacturing and processing errors came to light late in the cycle, delaying
the program andwasting manpower.
After the spacecraft fire, NASAlaunchedan extensive review of the Apollo ac-
ceptancetest practices. Subcontractorsand vendors for 33 Apollo spacecraft assem-
blies, representing a cross section of electrical, electronic, andelectromechanical
eqt_ipmenthroughout the spacecraft, received 79detailed questionsconcerning their
individual acceptancetest plans and objectives. This survey revealed the inadequacy
of environmental acceptancetests or, in manycases, the nonexistenceof acceptance
tests. Soon,both the commandand service module (CSM)andthe LM wouldcarry men
for the first time. The decision was madeby NASAto review completely all Apollo
spacecraft acceptance, checkout, and prelaunch test plans andprocedures.
In general, the review foundfactory checkoutandprelaunch tests at the launch
site adequateand, in manycases, with overly tight tolerances. Betweeninstallation
and launch, the equipmentpassedthe same tests a number of times.
The
in a more
results of
those who
revised overall testing ground rules, which came out of the review, resulted
efficient test plan from predelivery acceptance tests to launch. However, the
the environmental acceptance test review carry much more significance for
will make the decisions for future programs.
The prime contractor for the LM required nearly all subcontractors and vendors
to subject their equipment to 1 minute of random vibration in each of three mutually per-
pendicular axes. However, most of the vibration levels were very low, as table 3-I
shows. A decision early in the Apollo Program had set acceptance vibration test levels
6 decibels below those for qualification, or at 0.005 g2/Hz, whichever was greater.
(On the average random vibration table, one cannot practically set up a vibration level
lower than 0. 005 g2/Hz. ) Many of the components did not have to function or pass con-
tinuity checks during vibration tests, only before and after.
To determine proper acceptance vibration tests, a study reviewed 20 major aero-
space programs under nine different prime contractors. Bearing in mind the true pur-
pose of acceptance testing -- to prevent the installation and flight of substandard
equipment -- NASA combined the results with an understanding of the nature of the
failures encountered after acceptance testing. The resulting program fashioned Apollo
vibration tests after those for Gemini.
A component would have to withstand the vibration levels shown in figure 3-1 in
each of three mutually perpendicular axes for a minimum of 1 minute and a maximum
of 5 minutes. In addition, a firm ground rule pegged the minimum qualification vibra-
tion test level at 1.66 times the acceptance test level at all frequencies. In addition,
testers had to monitor all pilot-safety functions and continuously check all electrical
paths for continuity and short circuits during each of the three vibration cycles. The
testers also had to monitor all mission-success functions, if at all feasible, within
schedule and cost constraints. Of the original acceptance vibration test plans for ap-
proximately 150 deliverable LM items, 80 plans were changed significantly.
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TABLE 3-I.- LUNAR MODULE ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION TEST IN 1967
Subsystem
Communication and data
Electrical power
Environmental control
Guidance, navigation,
Quantity to
be vibrated
35
19
6
16
and control
Propulsion
Reaction control
Crew provisions
Displays and controls
7
2
5
22
Not
vibrated
Number vibrated at vibration level,
g2/Hz
<0.01
6
10
5
4
1 4
-0.01 >-0.02 ->0.03
->0.04
<0.02 <0.03 <0.04
6 2 21
3 1 1 4
7 1 4
1 2 1
4 12 2 2
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Figure 3-1.- Revised Apollo acceptance
vibration test guidelines.
A special procedure governed mission-
success equipment that could not be removed
from LM 3 and LM 4 without a serious im-
pact. Similar equipment for later space-
craft underwent the new tests. Some of the
test failures indicated the possibility of sim-
ilar failures on LM 3 and LM 4. Depending
on the failure probability and the impact of
the failure, we either changed to newly
tested equipment or accepted the risk.
A similar review of the CSM again
found vibration levels too low to detect
workmanship errors. A considerable num-
ber of the components experienced only
single-axis sine-wave excitation. Of over
200 deliverable items of CSM equipment
tabulated in table 3-II, the requirements
for 80 were changed.
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TABLE 3-II.- COMMANDANDSERVICEMODULE
ACCEPTANCEVIBRATION TEST IN 1967
Subsystem
Communicationanddata
Electrical power
Environmental control
Guidance, navigation,
Quantity to
bevibrated
33
24
65
28
and control
Propulsion
Reactioncontrol
Sequentialevents control
11
1
7
Not
vibrated
10
64
Number vibrated at vibration level,
g2/I-Iz
.i
>-0.01 >-0.02 >-0.03
< O. O1 ->0.04
<0.02 <0.03 <0.04
11
3
3 1 16 2
11
1
10 3 1 3 11
6 1 3
1 2 2
1
1
2
The need for thermal or thermal vacuum testing as a tool for finding workman-
ship faults became apparent during the review of components for reacceptance vibra-
tion testing. The construction of certain items prevented vibration tests from revealing
critical workmanship errors. As a result, some items were deleted from the accept-
ance vibration test list and required an acceptance thermal test. The review turned up
several Apollo components subject to acceptance thermal tests for this reason. How-
ever, the review team found the criteria governing acceptance and qualification thermal
testing and the relation between the two to be unacceptable.
A joint meeting of North American Rockwell, Grumman Aerospace, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, Boeing, and Manned Spacecraft Center representatives
replaced the old standards shown in table 3-III with the new standards graphed in fig-
ure 3-2. The new guidelines called for 1-1/2 temperature cycles with a swing of
100 ° F or more, starting and ending at room temperature. The guidelines specified
holding the test article at the two high-temperature and one low-temperature limits for
1 hour after the temperature had stabilized. The equipment should operate throughout
the test and undergo continuous monitoring for continuity. It should pass complete
functional tests immediately before and after the thermal test, and an adequate func-
tional test after stabilization at the high and low temperatures. Equipment suspected
of being adversely affected by temperature gradients should also complete functional
tests during the two transitions between the high-temperature and low-temperature
limits. An arbitrary decision set the acceptance test limits at 20 ° F less than the
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TABLE 3-III.-CRITERIA FOR LUNAR MODULE QUALIFICATION
AND ACCEPTANCE THERMAL TESTING IN 1967
Parameter Cold-plate cooled Radiation cooled
Qualification
Pressure, torr ........
Temperature, °F:
Root of flange ........
Environment a ........
1 × 10-5
35 to 135
0 to 160
1 ×10 -5
Not controlled
0 to 160
Acceptance
Pressure, torr ........
Temperature, °F:
Root of flange ........
Environment b ........
1 x 10-5
35 to 135
0 to 160
Ambient
Not controlled
30 to 130
aEquipment thermally isolated for 24 hours at each level.
bEquipment thermally isolatedfor 4 hours at each level.
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Figure 3-2.- Revised Apollo acceptance
thermal test guidelines.
qualificationtest limits. Equipment nor-
mally cooled on a cold plate should be
mounted on one during the test with the cool-
ant entering the cold plate externally con-
trolled to between 10° and 15° F cooler than
the environment. Of approximately 260 LM
and 215 CSM items of deliverable equipment
reviewed, 70 LM and 55 CSM items required
additional or new acceptance thermal tests
to augment or take the place of the accept-
ance vibration tests.
By December 1969, over 15 000 tests
had been performed to the revised environ-
mental acceptance test requirements. The
results are shown in figures 3-3 and 3-4,
and installation of acceptance-tested crew
equipment for the command module is shown
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Figure 3-4.- Results of acceptance ther-
mal tests for 3685 tests of 127 different
components.
in figure 3-5. While workmanship errors accounted for the majority of failures, de-
sign deficiencies not revealed during the qualification tests caused more failures than
expected. Because of the design problems and unavoidable test errors, the startup
phase was painful. Individual failure rates often exceeded 25 percent. Some exceeded
50 percent. With many new components entering environmental acceptance test during
the first year of the reacceptance test program, design and test error rates came down
slowly. However, both finally reached approximately 1.5 percent and have stayed there
for the past 9 months. Workmanship errors, on the other hand, have remained rela-
tively constant at approximately 5 percent.
In retrospect, several recommendations and points of interest stand out from the
test experience gained during this nation's three major manned spacecraft programs
over the past 10 years.
1. Design and development testing plays an important part in the overall test
plan. Perform it as early as possible. Document the results well, and hold the data
for future reference. Pay particular attention to what seem minor details, especially
for substitute parts and "explained" failures.
2. Perform qualification testing at the highest possible level of assembly prac-
tical, within reasonable cost and schedule constraints.
3. Before subjecting qualification test specimens to qualification test levels,
acceptance test the specimens by following approved test procedures under strict change
control. Include applicable environmental acceptance tests.
4. Qualification test specimens should come from among normal production items
manufactured and assembled using final blueprints and processes, under normal quality
control, and with production tooling and handling fixtures.
5. Make qualification tests rigorous and complete, yet realistic. A strong tend-
ency exists to qualify equipment to the designer's desires rather than to the actual re-
quirements. Where flight equipment will never leave controlled cleanroom conditions
and need operate only in outer space after launch, take care not to fall into the classical
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Figure 3-5.- Installation of the acceptance-testedcrew equipment in the Apollo
command module at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center.
qualification test programs, which require such things as salt-water immersion, rain
and dust, cyclic humidity, fungus, and other environmental extremes.
6. Carefully document, track, explain, and take necessary corrective action on
test failures encountered on all production hardware. Qualification test hardware, by
definition and from bitter experience, must count as production hardware. No sus-
pected failure encountered during any test on production hardware should escape from
this rule, no matter how insignificant or unrelated the failure may seem at the time.
Experience has shown that major failures always receive adequate attention. The
minor unreported failure is the one that slips by and shows up late in the vehicle test
cycle or, worst of all, in flight.
7. Perform qualification vibration testing at excitation levels that provide a
50-percent margin of safety over the expected environments, including acceptance vi-
bration testing. Because of weight and volume considerations, power consumption, or
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other limiting factors, this margin may have to decrease. Whenthis becomesevident,
treat eachcase on an individual basis and makesure all parties involved understand.
8. Thermal test for qualification to temperature limits at least 20° F outside
the expectedtemperature limits, including acceptancethermal testing.
9. Monitor the functioning of test specimensduring the dynamic phasesof qual-
ification and environmental acceptance testing as completely as possible. Test all
functions with 100-percent monitoring, including all redundant paths, before and after
appropriate phases of the qualification and acceptance tests.
10. Subject to environmental acceptance tests components of critical equipment
that must function electrically or mechanically, when the complete deliverable item
cannot be visually inspected or functionally tested (or both) for design, manufacturing,
assembly, handling, procedural, or workmanship errors.
11. Determine environmental acceptance test requirements on an individual
basis, considering what types and what levels of tests reveal quality or workmanship
defects. Examine the failure history of each component during the engineering and
development stages and during qualification testing. Look at the failure history of like
components using similar manufacturing and assembly techniques, particularly those
made by the same vendor, in the same plant, and with the same people.
12. Carry out environmental acceptance testing at the lowest practical level of
assembly. For example, it is much better to find the solder balls in a sealed relay
before building it into an assembly than to cope with an intermittent system failure on
the launch pad. The earlier one uncovers a problem and eliminates it from downstream
hardware, the less its impact on the overall program.
13. Carefully examine changes of any nature to the hardware for their effect on
qualification and acceptance test results. Qualification by similarity can give very
misleading results and should take place only with full knowledge of all parties con-
cerned. In the case of acceptance testing, the simple act of removing a cover plate for
inspection purposes constitutes potential grounds for a reacceptance test.
14. Total vehicle environmental acceptance tests are desirable. However, tests
of this nature become virtually impossible to perform on manned spacecraft. Thorough
qualification of spacecraft components, including wiring and tubing installations, com-
bined with proper environmental acceptance tests of the equipment before installation,
has thus far assured mission success.
15. Always retest after changes to the hardware or software have been made.
Set up rigorous controls to assure it.
16. When possible, test all functions and paths on the installed systems at least
once prior to delivery to the launch site. As a general rule, when changes or replace-
ments require retesting, do it at the factory. Prelaunch testing at the launch site
should demonstrate total space-vehicle and launch-complex compatibility and readiness.
They should not simply prove the adequacy of a given component or single system.
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At the start of a program, devise a thorough overall integrated test plan that in-
cludes all testing (including engineering and development, qualification, reliability and
life, predelivery environmental acceptance, preinstallation acceptance, installed sys-
tem, altitude, prelaunch, and early unmannedflight tests). The plan should include as
much testing as necessary to gain confidencein the hardware, the software, the test
equipment, the test procedures, the launchprocedures, and the flight crew procedures.
The plan shouldprovide for deleting unnecessary phasesof testing as confidence grows.
We believe these measureshave proved themselves in the Apollo Program. By
calculating from the designand workmanship failure rates during reacceptancetests,
the program corrected or removedbefore launch approximately 65potential spacecraft
pilot-safety or mission-critical hardware failures per flight. Somefaults remained.
Eachof the first 10vehicles flown on the first six mannedApollo missions experienced
approximately eight hardware failures. But fewer than two failures per vehicle
stemmed from workmanship or quality. Of the total flight failures from these two
causes, better or more thoroughacceptancetesting could conceivably have revealed
only five. Also, no evidencein the flight-failure history indicates a failure causedby
too muchtesting.
The real effectiveness of the test program comes out in examining the results of
hardware failures during the first six mannedApollo flights. Noneof the flight failures
affected pilot safety or mission success.
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4. APOLLO CREW PROCEDURES,
SIMULATION, AND FLIGHT PLANNING
By Warren J. North and C. H. Woodling
Man ned Spacecraft Cente r
The formative stages of Project Mercury saw various opinions as to the degree
of crew control that should be permitted. To most space planners, Mercury seemed a
logical extension of high-performance aircraft flight, in which brief periods of high-
altitude zero-g activity had been experienced with no adverse effects. However, there
were skeptics who felt that space flight would require radically new procedures and
crew operational constraints.
As it developed, Mercury and Gemini attitude control, systems monitoring, and
longitudinal translation maneuvers evolved very similar procedurally to aircraft prac-
tice. Consequently, the basic concepts for Apollo crew procedures reflect techniques
proved in aircraft, Mercury, and Gemini operations.
Over the past decade, space-vehicle designs have incorporated increased astro-
naut participation to improve vehicle reliability. Mercury used automatically guided
military boosters, which were originally designed without consideration for manual
monitoring and control. Therefore, it seemed expedient to accept a passive role for
the crew. This was done at the expense of developing an elaborate automatic abort-
sensing system to protect the pilot in the event of booster failure. The pilot did get a
backup abort handle for slow-drift guidance failures that could not be sensed by the
automatic system. In Gemini, the complex automatic escape system was eliminated
in favor of manual launch-vehicle monitoring procedures and aircraft ejection seats
that could be manually triggered if the launch vehicle malfunctioned or if the spacecraft
parachute failed during descent.
The enormous TNT equivalency of a "worst case" Saturn booster explosion
placed a Mercury-like escape rocket on the Apollo spacecraft. Then concern for a
growing control-system failure, coupled with maximum aerodynamic pressure,
prompted inclusion of an automatic abort system. Two minutes after lift-off, this au-
tomatic system is manually disabled, and the booster firing is terminated manually in
the event of a malfunction. Crew displays include the status of launch-vehicle engines
and tank pressures. The launch vehicle can be controlled manually if the Saturn iner-
tial platform fails; this ability did not exist in Mercury or Gemini, but was introduced
after several years of research and analysis.
Apollo rendezvous, formation flight, and docking maneuvers resemble closely
those developed in Gemini. (This, of course, was a major reason for Gemini.)
Another significant Gemini carryover is the backup rendezvous procedure, which can
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be used if the onboardradar, inertial platform, or computer shouldfail. Placement
of rendezvous maneuvers for optimum orbital lighting took advantageof Gemini
experience.
Gemini extravehicular activity revealed an anomaly in simulation, which was
corrected for Apollo. Short-duration zero-g aircraft parabolas did not reveal the fa-
tiguing effect of long-term tasks in a Gemini pressure suit. For the later Gemini
flights, water-immersed simulations (fig. 4-1)provided realistic long-term zero-g
workloads. This type of simulation enabled the development of Apollo contingency ex-
travehicular activity (EVA) transfer procedures. An Apollo contingency transfer is
required if the lunar module (LM) cannot be docked to the command module (CM) after
lunar- orbit r endezvou s.
Figure 4-1. - Astronaut trains underwater in simulated zero-g condition in water-
immersion facility. Astronaut wears weights on shoulders, wrists, and ankles.
Total ballast is about 180 pounds.
Although the spacecraft guidance system normally specifies the proper reentry
roll angle that is required to maneuver down range or cross range to the target, Gem-
ini and Apollo employ basically the same backup techniques for using the earth horizon
to monitor manually and achieve proper reentry roll angles for ranging.
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PROCEDURESAPOLLO INTRODUCED
Apollo of course encompassed the
lunar landing. Although helicopter exper-
ience indicated that low-speed maneuvering
and vertical descents were straightforward,
the lunar landing involved a much higher
approach velocity and descent rate, poten-
tial visibility problems, and a 1/6g ma-
neuvering environment. Because of the
difficulty in training for manual landings
in this environment, there were sugges-
tions that we should accept automatic
landings and the attendant probability of
abort, if the automatic system targeted
the spacecraft to a boulder or crater. The
obvious desire to land rather than to abort
triggered a major effort to build a free-
flight training vehicle (fig. 4-2) which
would fly in the atmosphere of the earth
and would simulate the 1/6g handling
characteristic of the LM. Early flights
with this vehicle impressed the pilots with
the unusually large pitch and roll angles
required to achieve and null translational
velocities. The flights also indicated that
from altitudes of approximately 500 feet,
the vehicle could be maneuvered to
avoid obstructions after several famil-
iarization flights.
Lunar-surface EVA likewise had no
analogy in previous programs. Improved
mobility of the Apollo suit, on the other
hand, encouraged rapid development of
lunar-surface EVA procedures. Three
techniques were used to investigate the
effects of 1/6g: The KC-135 aircraft
(fig. 4-3), the overhead-supported
gimbaled harness (fig. 4-4), and the water-
immersion facility. Used in a complemen-
tary fashion, these simulation devices
yielded results which indicated that 1/6g
maneuvering stability was no particular
problem; in fact, if one started to fall, it
was easy to recover because of the low
falling acceleration.
Another significant procedural dif-
ference between G e m i n i and Apollo
Figure 4-2. - Lunar landing training ve-
hicle trains crews for last 500 feet of
altitude in critical moon landing phase.
Figure 4-3.- Lunar module mockup in-
stalled in KC-135 aircraft. Support
structure takes loads imposed in
2-1/2g pullup, after which zero g is
achieved for 20 to 30 seconds on a
parabolic flight path.
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Figure 4-4.- Familiarization run on the
mobile partial-gravity simulator used
for lunar walk indoctrination.
concerned the abilityof the crew, in the
event of a ground communications failure,
to navigate with the onboard sextant/
computer and to calculate spacecraft ma-
neuvers for safe return to the earth.
Critical Gemini maneuvers were made
within the communications range of ground
stations,but the Apollo lunar-orbit retro-
grade burn and the criticaltransearth burn
occur behind the moon, where crew pro-
cedures cannot be monitored by the ground.
NAVIGATION, GUI DANCE AND
CONTROL PROCEDURES
Some 40 percent of crew training in-
volves becoming proficient in the use of
the three spacecraft navigation systems
(one in the CM and two in the LM) and the
four guidance systems (two in the CM and
two in the LM). The crew interfaces
chiefly with these systems through com-
puter keyboards which are about half the
size of a typewriter keyboard. Approxi-
mately 10 500 individual computer key-
strokes are required to complete the lunar
mission. The crew must activate individ-
ual programs within the computer to exe-
cute launch, midcourse navigation,
spacecraft propulsion maneuvers, lunar-
landmark tracking, lunar descent, lunar platform alinement, ascent, rendezvous, and
reentry. Within each program, there are many routines or options. The computer
display and keyboard includes three 5-digit registers through which the crew observes
displays (such as total velocity, altitude, and altitude rate during the lunar descent).
The primary control systems in both the CM and the LM include digital autopilots
which are adjusted through keyboard activity. The crew selects optimum jet configu-
ration, attitude deadband, and maneuver rates. Large variations in vehicle configura-
tion throughout the mission require the crew to be very familiar with control
characteristics and handling qualities, which range from sluggish to sporty over the
interval from initial booster staging to docking of the lightweight LM.
Much of the crew preflight time goes into reviewing propulsion and guidance mal-
function procedures. In this work, alternate system displays are compared to the
primary display. If it appears that the primary system has failed, the crew manually
makes a switchover. As an example of system redundancy, the initial lunar-orbit in-
sertion maneuver is made with the main service module (SM) engine under automatic
control by the primary guidance system, but failure of the primary system can be
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backedupmanually by using the stabilization and control system. If the SM main en-
gine fails during the burn, two crewmembers transfer to the LM, activate the systems,
and ignite the descent-stage engine to place the two spacecraft on a return-to-earth
trajectory. If the LM descent-stage engine fails, the descent stage is jettisoned, and
the LM ascent-stage engine is ignited. The crew controls docked configuration from
the LM manually by using the reaction-control system in a translation mode, rather
than an efficient attitude-control mode (because of the shifted center of gravity of the
docked configuration). A primary guidance system failure of the LM can be backed up
by the abort guidance system; as an ultimate control-system backup, either vehicle
can be controlled in a manual mode in which the LM pilot control inputs go directly to
the reaction jets with no rate-damping feedback.
To provide the crew with this depth and ability to monitor, switch, and control
may seem unduly redundant; however, this depth of capability has provided a verifica-
tion of the adequacy of the primary procedures. Several changes to the primary ren-
dezvous procedures were made, so that the maneuvers could be more easily monitored
and remain consistent with the backup procedures.
During descent, the landing site comes into view at the bottom of the LM window
at an altitude of 7000 feet, a range of 4 miles, a velocity of 450 fps, and a descent rate
of 160 fps. By observing through his window, the commander (in the left-hand crew
station) determines if the guidance is targeted to the correct landing area. If not, he
can incrementally change the spacecraft flight path 2 ° laterally and 0.5 ° up range or
down range, by actuations of the right-hand attitude controller.
In the right-hand crew station, the LM pilot is closely monitoring the altitude,
the altitude rate, the lateral velocities, and the remaining propellant and is updating
the backup guidance system altitude. He calls out altitude and altitude rate to the
commander. All of these parameters are compared to nominal and to the limits set
as abort criteria. The commander normally takes control in a manual atitude-hold
mode at an altitude of approximately 500 feet. At this point, horizontal velocity has
dropped to 70 fps and the vertical velocity to 17 fps. The rate of descent is controlled
at this time by making discrete inputs to the guidance system at a rate of 1 fps per
switch cycle.
Normally some 2 to 4 percent of the descent propellant remains after the landing.
Aircraft fuel reserves at landing are considerably greater. Clearly, a critical Apollo
crew procedure is propellant monitoring.
The percentage of descent propellant remaining is computed and displayed on dig-
ital read-outs. With 2 minutes of propellant remaining, a tank-level sensor is un-
covered and a warning light is displayed. The LM descends at a rate of approximately
3 fps° After touchdown and engine shutoff, the crew immediately checks the status of
all systems in preparation for an emergency lift-off. If all propulsion, environmental,
and guidance systems are satisfactory, preparations are made for powering down the
spacecraft and for lunar surface exploration. The subsequent ascent from the lunar
surface involves spacecraft power-up, inertial-platform alinement, and a long series
of checklist procedures which terminate with descent-stage separation and ascent-
engine ignition. During this phase of lunar activity, the two-man crew performs the
functions of the entire launch complex and blockhouse crew at Cape Kennedy.
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I NFLI GHT PHOTOGRAPHY
Besides providing a documentary
record of the flight, in/light photography
has become a vital part of future mission
planning. Television pictures taken sev-
eral years ago by Orbiter spacecraft
formed the base line for constructing the
flight maps and the simulator relief
model. However, because full coverage
of high-resolution pictures does not exist
for all of the Apollo landing sites, it has
been necessary to obtain additional
70-millimeter still photography of some
future sites. (See fig. 4-5. ) Coordina-
tion of this photography requires careful
planning to s c h e d u 1 e the photography
passes at the proper sun angle and to
minimize usage of critical spacecraft
attitude- control propellants.
Figure 4-5. - Apollo 12 landing and ascent
model of Surveyor and Snowman craters
as seen from 1800 feet.
SIMULATION
The development of theApollo simulation program and associated trainers closely
paralleled the development of the Apollo flight hardware and the increasing mission
complexity. As flight operations phased from Gemini to Apollo and as the Apollo flights
progressed from single to dual spacecraft operations, from earth-orbital to lunar-
orbital activities, and finally to the lunar landing, the scope and capability of simula-
tions matured to keep pace with the increasing complexity.
The Gemini Program provided an
excellent beginning for Apollo training,
because its progress in accurately simu- _
lating and adequately training flight crews
in the launch, rendezvous, and entry
modes was directly applicable. In fact,
the first Apollo part-task simulators were
converted Gemini simulators. The com-
puter complex and in/inity-optics system
from the Gemini mission simulators were
integrated with simulated crew stations
for the CM procedures simulator (CMPS)
and the LM procedures simulator shown
in figure 4-6. The simulated Agena tar-
get vehicle and Gemini spacecraft were
replaced with the CM target mockup and
the LM crew station on the translation and Figure 4-6.- Command module procedures
simulator and lunar module procedures
simulator.
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docking simulator, shown in figure 4-7.
The dynamics crew procedures simulator,
shownin figure 4-8, was converted to the
CM crew station for launch and launch-
abort training, shownin figure 4-9.
The combinedflight of two manned
spacecraft during the Apollo 9 mission was
a major step in all aspectsof flight oper-
ations. A corresponding major accom-
plishment was the addition of the LM
mission simulator (LMS), shownin fig-
ure 4-10, into the trainer complex and
integration of the LMS with the CM mis-
sion simulator (CMS), shown in figure 4-I 1.
The tie-in between the mission sim-
ulators and the Mission Control Center at
the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)
marked a significant step in realistically
Figure 4-7.- Translation and docking
trainer simulates lunar module active
docking over last 100 feet of separation
distance.
Figure 4-8. - Dynamics crew procedures
simulator.
Figure 4-9.- Simulated command module
crew station for the dynamics crew pro-
cedures simulator.
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Figure 4-10.- Lunar module mission sim-
ulator with crew station and Farrand
optical systems for three windows.
Figure 4-11.- Visual optics and instructor
station for command module mission
simulator.
conducting space-flight dress rehearsals. The simulations required synchronization
of 13 large digital computers, operating together in real time.
The progression of Apollo 8 and 10 to the lunar sphere of influence and the inte-
grated operation of the two spacecraft in lunar orbit required more simulation capabil-
ities, such as additional trajectory equations, new simulator operating modes (fast
time_ step ahead, safe store) and a complete new set of out-the-window scenes for the
crews.
Apollo 11, of course, introduced the
final operational phase, landing on the
lunar s u r f a c e. To simulate the lunar
landing, it was necessary to build a lunar-
terrain m od e 1 (fig. 4-12) for precise
training on the mission simulators of the
final-approach and manual-touchdown
phases. It was also necessary to use the
lunar landing (1/6g} free-flight trainer.
The scope and complexity of the
Apollo missions necessitated a compre-
hensive procedures-verification and crew-
familiarization program through a variety
of part-task and mission simulations. As
mentioned previously, some of the Gemini
procedures directly carried over to Apol-
lo, but numerous new areas required fur-
ther analysis and c r e w verification.
Launch-abort monitoring and launch-
vehicle control (Saturn V launch vehicle)
Figure 4-12.- Apollo 12 landing and ascent
visual simulation system.
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were analyzedin detail at the NASAAmes Research Center and by contractor personnel
in separate studies before the backupcontrol of the launchvehicle from the spacecraft
was developed. The first flight incorporating this backup modewas onAS-505 with
the Apollo 10 flight. The ability to provide pilot control from the spacecraft for the
Saturn IVB stageduring the translunar injection maneuverswas thoroughly checkedout
by engineers and pilots on the DCPSand CMSbefore the Apollo 10mission.
Considerable revisions were made in the CM computer flight program after the
Apollo 7 flight to improve the guidanceand navigation logic during rendezvous. Some
1200 man-hours and 100 machine-hours were spent by the MSC engineers with the
CMPSin working out the optimum crew displays, procedures, andtracking schedules
for the newflight software. Many more hours were spent with the flight crews on the
CMPSand CMSfamiliarizing and training them for the Apollo 9 mission.
In lunar descent and landing, simulation and training emphasizedthe monitoring
of the primary guidancesystem and the takeover by the commander for the final phase
of manual control to touchdown. More than 220landings were flown on the LMS by two
astronauts (who subsequentlyflew the first and secondactual lunar landings) solely to
determine the best hand-controller authority for LM attitude-control system.
Developmentof the activation procedures of the passive LM in flight (the first
such requirement in mannedspace flight) necessitateda comprehensiveanddetailed
systems simulation provided only by the LMS. The LM integrated activation check-
lists were worked out andverified for the two navigation systems, two radar systems,
andthree propulsion systems.
The maintenanceof a high degree of mission-simulator fidelity was emphasized.
No part of the system was more critical in this respect than the simulated guidance
and navigation system. The use of an interpretive approachto simulate the Apollo
guidancecomputer on both the CMSand the LMS provided not only exceptional fidelity
but also the ability to accept late software changesand mission-peculiar tapes and to
introduce these rapidly into the training. Numerous full-dress rehearsals were ex-
ecutedwith the flight crews in the mission simulators at CapeKennedyand the flight
control team in the Mission Control Center at MSC. This training used the latest pos-
sible operational trajectory and spacecraft data to ensure complete verification of both
flight and ground programs and comprehensive familiarization by the entire flight op-
erations team.
Many simulations were executed with trainers other than the spacecraft mission
and part-task simulators. Zero-g simulation of EVA contingency transfer by using the
water-immersion facility at MSC (fig. 4-1) was an extension of the experience and
techniques derived during Gemini. The partial-gravity simulator, which used a ser-
voed, vertically mounted suspension system to take up five-sixths of the weight of the
suited crewman, permitted long-duration 1/6g simulations. A truck-mounted device
which used this same simulation technique allowed training at various traverse rates
(fig. 4-4).
Many training hours went to one-g walk-throughs with mockups of spacecraft and
equipment. Specific areas of training ranged from onboard stowage, photographic
equipment handling, and docking-tunnel probe and drogue operations to full-blown
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lunar-surface EVA walk-throughs. The lunar-surface walk-throughs included special
1/6g mockups of the Apollo lunar-surface experiment packageand the lunar-surface
tools.
FLIGHT PLANNING
Apollo flight planning involves a much more complex procedures-integration task
than did Mercury or Gemini, because of the large number of crew tasks associated
with two manned spacecraft. Four or five months before launch, the flight planner
must take the list of mission objectives, the preliminary launch-vehicle trajectory, the
preliminary operational trajectory, the crew work and sleep constraints, and network
tracking constraints and must integrate the numerous systems procedures of the many-
phased Apollo mission. Because of the requirement to minimize use of reaction con-
trol propellant, hydrogen, and oxygen, several iterations are required to establish the
proper timing of maneuver rates and spacecraft power configurations during the
mission.
Original time line estimates for the various mission phases derive from the mis-
sion simulators in which all spacecraft systems are dynamically simulated. Space-
craft housekeeping, EVA preparation, and post-EVA procedures are worked out in
high-fidelity mockups. The spacecraft stowage list itemizes 445 pieces of equipment,
each of which must be procedurally integrated into the flight plan. Some 1300 copies
of the flight plan are distributed to NASA and contractor personnel 3 months before the
launch. If the flight plan is considered in a broad context to include all onboard paper
including time lines, checklists, and graphics, the package weighs about 20 pounds.
For each Apollo mission, hundreds of changes were made and verified on these data
during the last 3 months before flight. Many changes reflected differences in the final
trajectory, procedural refinements derived from simulation experience, and correc-
tion of anomalies on the previous flight.
We set a rigorous procedures change discipline for 2 months before the flight.
This controls suggested alternate techniques which may appear preferable for a par-
ticular subsystem, but must be considered in terms of the interrelated operational
time line before acceptance. We also establish a rapid procedures information loop
during the final simulation phase, which also begins 2 months before the launch. This
simulation activity involves flight planners, flight crews, mission simulators, flight
controllers, and the tracking network. Normal and emergency procedures are thor-
oughly tested.
The Apollo flights speak for the value of this simulation effort in verifying late
changes, validating procedures, and establishing crew readiness.
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5. FLIGHT CONTROL IN THE APOLLO PROGRAM
By Eugene F. Kranz and James Otis Covington
Manned Spacecraft Center
Apollo 12 lifted off the pad at 11:22 a.m.e.s.t, on November 14, 1969. At
36.5 seconds after lift-off, lightning struck the command and service module (CSM),
disconnecting all three fuel cells from the main buses and placing the main loads on
two of the three batteries which ordinarily supply reentry power (fig. 5-1). Fuel cell
disconnect flags popped up, and caution and warning lights winked on to alert the crew.
With the decrease in the main bus power, the primary signal conditioning equipment
ceased operating as it is meant to do when main bus voltages drop to approximately
22 volts. The ground simultaneously lost telemetry lock. At first, flight controllers
thought the plume of ionized rocket-exhaust particles had blacked out the telemetry
signal. However, they abandoned this theory when the crew reported the warning
lights.
The primary signal conditioning equipment controls most electrical-power
measurements; therefore, there was little information with which to diagnose the
trouble. At 52 seconds after lift-off, the crew reported losing the spacecraft platform.
At 60 seconds, the ground locked on to the telemetry signal again, and the CSM elec-
trical and environmental systems engineer, John W. Aaron, asked the crew to switch
to the secondary signal conditioning equipment to get additional insight into the elec-
trical system. At 98 seconds, the crew made the switch, restoring all telemetry.
Aaron then noted from his data display that three fuel cells were disconnected and re-
quested the crew to reset them. Fuel cells 1 and 2 went back on the line at 144 sec-
onds; fuel cell 3, at 171 seconds. Main bus voltages rose to approximately 30 volts,
and all electrical parameters returned to normal.
Throughout the entire launch the Saturn launch vehicle performed normally. The
spacecraft entered the proper orbit, and the crew and ground began preparing for trans-
lunar injection.
The quick response to the Apollo 12 outage came about not as a result of blind
luck but of careful planning, training, and development of people, procedures, and
data display techniques by those responsible for flight control.
The flight control organization devotes a majority of its time and resources to
careful premission planning and detailed training. This premission preparation culmi-
nates in simulations of critical phases of the mission with the flight crew. These
simulations prepare the flight controllers and the flight crew to respond properly to
both normal and contingency situations.
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|Figure 5-1.- Electrical power display when Apollo 12 was at an altitude of 6000 feet.
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Following one of the basic Flight Control Division philosophies, operations per-
sonnel take part in planning a mission from its conception through its execution. They
participate in two areas where their operational experience contributes greatly: (1) in
the early stages of mission design and (2) in setting basic design requirements for
various spacecraft systems. As a result, both spacecraft hardware and mission design
have optimum operational qualities.
The true operational phases of the Flight Control Division begin after the space-
craft design reaches completion and NASA has committed itself to constructing flight
vehicles and launch facilities. The development of mission operations starts after suf-
ficient information about the detailed design of the space vehicles becomes available.
The development takes 2 years and is divided into four phases, as shown in figure 5-2:
mission development, detailed planning, testing and training, and real-time operational
support of a flight.
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Figure 5-2. - Mission-development time line.
The mission development phase begins approximately 2 years before the first
launch. First comes the establishing of the conceptual operational guidelines for the
flight. The guidelines for the Apollo Program were developed during Project Mercury
and the Gemini Program.
43
Throughout the Mercury and Gemini flight programs, teams of flight controllers
at the remote tracking stations handledcertain operational responsibilities delegated
to them somewhatindependentlyof the main control center. As the flight programs
progressed, the advantagesof havingone centralized flight control team becamemore
apparent. By the adventof the Apollo Program, two high-speed (2.4 kbps) data lines
connectedeach remote site to the Mission Control Center (MCC), permitting the cen-
tralization of flight control there.
The spacecraft systems were of two
functional categories: (1) electrical, envi-
ronmental, and communicationsand
(2) guidanceand control andpropulsion. A
flight controller in the Mission Operations
Control Room (fig. 5-3) of the MCC moni-
tored eachone. He received the backing
of the Staff SupportRoomwhere every
spacecraft system had its ownman.
The flight dynamics team philosophy
remained unchangedfrom earlier pro-
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craft trajectory and plan changes to it,
monitor and manage the three spacecraft Figure 5-3.- Mission Operations Control
computers, and plan the return to earth. Room divisions.
The function of the Flight Director
and his staff also remained unchanged. The Flight Director directs and coordinates
the flight control team. He may, after analysis of the flight, take any action neces-
sary to complete the mission successfully.
Following mission definition, flight control personnel participate in flight opera-
tions planning meetings. At this intercenter (Manned Spacecraft Center, Marshall
Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, and NASA
Headquarters) forum, operations personnel can directly influence the first detailed
mission design. As the mission design begins to take shape, they have an opportunity
to analyze the possible effects of various failures on the successful completion of the
mission. They can then suggest alternate mission designs or hardware changes (or
both) which would improve chances for success. As the mission plan solidifies, the
operations personnel identify certain guidelines and constraints forming boundaries
within which the detailed mission planning will take place.
Concurrent with the development of the operations concepts and the mission
guidelines and constraints, systems flight controllers begin to gather detailed systems
information from the spacecraft manufacturers. The systems flight controllers get
functional schematics and engineering drawings which they translate into a handbook of
spacecraft systems. Flight control personnel and the flight crew use this handbook
during the mission. On one page, like that reproduced in figure 5-4, each schematic
shows all system or subsystem interfaces, together with the power sources, onboard
and ground instrumentation, the various controls and displays necessary for the opera-
tion of that system, and pertinent notes on system performance. As a spinoff, prepara-
tion of the systems handbooks provides a chance to spot potential systems design
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inadequacies. On completion of the systems handbooks,the long-lead-time items com-
prising the mission developmentphasecome to a close.
The phaseII detailed planningbegins6 to 9 monthsbefore launchwhenNASAas-
signs detailed mission objectives to the particular mission. Theobjectives are assigned
to a particular phasein the mission time line, andflight control personnel work with
the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office to establish their order of priority.
Flight controllers begin defining the specific data necessary to carry out the de-
tailed mission objective and monitor the operational spacecraft systems. They do this
parameter by parameter, assigning a priority to each. Programers can then write the
software required to provide these data to the flight controllers in a usable form.
Meanwhile, the mission rules begin to take shape. The rules specify in great
detail how to conduct the mission in both normal and contingency situations. The final
list constitutes a three-way agreement among flight control personnel, the flight crew,
and management personnel.
Flight crew safety overrides all else. Then come into play complex tradeoffs be-
tween mission objectives and spacecraft design, the reliability and maturity of all ele-
ments associated with the conduct and control of the mission, the mission-objective
priorities, and risk tradeoffs.
Mission rules fall into two distinct categories: (1) general guidelines formulated
by the Flight Director and his staff and (2) detailed rules formulated by individual flight
controllers in response to the general guidelines. One general guideline reads as
follows:
During lunar module powered descent, if a systems failure occurs, a choice is
available.
1. Early in powered descent when descent-propulsion-system-to-orbit capability
is available (up to powered descent initiation plus 5 minutes), it is preferable to abort
in flight rather than to continue descent. Redundant capability of critical lunar module
systems is required to continue powered descent during this period.
2. During the remainder of powered descent, it is preferable to land and launch
from the lunar surface rather than to abort. Only those system failures or trends that
indicate impending loss of the capability to land, ascend, and achieve a safe orbit from
the lunar surface, or impending loss of life-support capability will be cause for abort
during this period.
This rule came about because up to 5 minutes after powered descent initiation,
one can abort and reach orbit by using only the descent stage. One can keep the descent
stage and use its consumables (oxygen, water, and batteries) if it takes a long time to
rendezvous or if one loses the ascent consumables. After 5 minutes in powered descent,
the descent propellant remaining could not return the craft to orbit. It then becomes
more desirable to continue on and land. By landing and lifting off one revolution
(2 hours) later, one gains sufficient time to analyze the malfunction, perform any sys-
tem reconfigurations necessary, and perform a nominal ascent and rendezvous. Since
the flight crew and the flight controllers emphasize nominal activities most, they know
them best and always use them if possible.
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Detailed rules, suchas the ones listed in figure 5-5, expand upon the broad
philosophy of the general guidelines to cover single failures of all individual systems
and subsystems throughout the spacecraft down to the individual instrumentation points
necessary to making mission-rule decisions.
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MISStON RULES
SECTION 2 FLIGHT OPERATIONS R_LES
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Figure 5-5. - Sample of flight mission rules.
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The specific format for mission rules has remained the same since Project Mer-
cury. A short statement describes the condition or malfunction which may require
action. The ruling follows. A third section of the rule contains applicable notes, com-
ments, or standard operating procedures. Documents carefully delineate the reason-
ing behind each mission rule, including tradeoffs which may not be otherwise apparent.
Standard operating procedures receive as careful attention. They divide into
interface procedures and personal procedures. Interface procedures include all flight
control procedures involving more than two console positions. Together, the proce-
dures comprise the Flight Control Operations Handbook (FCOH). Like the mission
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rules, the FCOHprocedures appear in a standard format andare as brief as possible
without becomingambiguous. Checklists, like the one shownin figure 5-6, are used
whenever possible.
Personal procedures go intothe Flight Controller Console Handbook prepared for
each console position. This handbook describes the job of the flightcontroller manning
that position and detailsthe procedures he must follow. As does the FCOH, ituses,
whenever possible, checklists of the kind shown in figure 5-7.
The testing and trailAng phase has two main purposes: (1) integrating the flight
control team and (2) testing the procedures and mission rules prepared for the specific
mission. Six distinct techniques are used to train flight controllers for a mission.
Several are used simultaneously. As described earlier, documentation development
proved to be one of the most successful techniques. The system flight controllers gain
an intimate knowledge of the hardware design and what it will and will not do through
their long weeks and months of preparing the spacecraft systems handbooks. Likewise,
the flight controllers learn the various ramifications of the mission rules by discussing
the various merits of alternate courses of action. Preparing the procedural documents
instills in the flight controller the capabilities and responsibilities of his position and
the methods of using his position most efficiently.
Formal classes convene periodically to examine spacecraft systems in detail, to
present basic orbital mechanics laws and principles, and to give instructionon the ca-
pabilitiesand limitationsof the ground systems. Programed instructionmethods, as
developed in 1965 by the Air Force, underwent slightmodification for flightcontrol
training. Programed-instruction courses covered all spacecraft systems and, ulti-
mately, all functionaljob positions in various levels of detail, thus providing two bene-
fits. The courses provided easily assimilated material, such as that shown in
figure 5-8, which helped individualflightcontrollers understand the problems and re-
sponsibilitiesof other flightcontrollers and assisted in training controllers who could
move rapidly from one job to another.
During the Gemini and Apollo Programs, cockpit-system trainers were developed
for flight control training. These automated trainers allow the flight controllers to be-
come familiar with the problems encountered by the flight crew. With the trainers,
flight controllers identify, develop, and exercise critical crew procedures.
Through his support of program office design reviews, single-point failure re-
views, and detailed mission requirement reviews (to name a few), the flight controller
could associate directly with the designers, builders, and operators of the flight hard-
ware. This often provides a rare insight to critical information that may affect all
areas of planning and preparation of a mission.
Simulation began 2 or 3 months before launch. The entire flight control team took
part. Artificially created spacecraft and network data flowed into the control center,
providing real-time responses and displays as if a mission were actually in progress.
The first mission simulations worked with computer-generated mathematical
models of space vehicles. These provided flight controller training in exercising
documented procedures and mission rules in response to live data and a dynamic mis-
sion situation. Approximately 30 percent of the total simulation time goes into working
with the mathematical model.
48
SOP _,l
REV A
TM FORMAT SELECTION
[e PURPOSE
THE CAPABILITY EXISTS TO bELECT 19 TM FORMATS FROM A MSD SITE, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES
DEFINE uTILiZATION OF THE FORMATS AND ASSIGN PRIORITIES TO VARIOUS FORMATS DEPENDING ON
_ISSION PHASE.
I[° PARTICIPATION
TIC BOOSTER
GUIDANCE HOUSTON TM
PROCEDURES G&N
TELMU CONTROL
Ill° PROCEDURES
AI MSD FORMATS
Bo
TABLE _,1-2 SNOWS THE NOMINAL MSD FORMAT PLAN, THIS PLAN PROVIDES TIC WiTH THE
HSD FORMAT NUMBERS TO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SITES BY F-2 DAYS, THE STATION N&O
WILL BRING HIS SITE UP IN THE REuuIRED FORMATS BY H-15 MINUTES. FOR DEVIATIONS
FROM THIS PLANP PROCEDURES WILL PROVIDE TIC THE TM FORMAT NUMBER TO BE EXECUTED
VIA PRM AT H-5 MINUTES TO THE SITE°S PASS.
IF AN MCC F/C DESIRES TO CHANGE THE MS TM FORMATe HE WILL COORDINATE THROUGIq
PROCEDURES. PROCEDURES WILL COORDINATE WITH OTHER AFFECTED F/C°S AND IF NO
OBJECT|ON$ ARE RECEIVED ON AFD CONF LOOP wITHIN _5 SECONDS, PROCEDURES W|LL
REUUEST THE CHANGE FROM TIC ON THE CCATS TM MUM LOOP. TIC WILL ISSUE A PRM
FORMAT CHANGE EXECUTE FROM HIS CON_LE. IF TIC HA6 NO iNDICATION OF FORMAT
CHANGE wITHIN 5 TO _0 sECONDSo TIC WILL REISSUE THE PRM EXECUTE. IF TIC HAS NO
INDICATION OF FORMAT CHANGE AFTER THREE EXECUTESo HE WILL REQUEST THE STATION
M&O ON GOSS C/NET 2 TO MANUALLY SELECT THE DESIRED FORMAT.
DURING THE LAUNCH PHASED BOOSTER AND/OR GUIDANCE CAN DIRECT TIC TO CHANGE HSD
FORMAT CHANGES ON THE CCATS TM HUN LOOP.
MCC PCMGS ANALOG PATCHING FORMATS
GbN (vEH SYS SSR)P AFTER PROPER COORDINATION IN THE
DURING THE PROPER MISSION PHASES OVER THE RTCC TLM
PCMGS FORMATS*
FORMAT
9
$$R, WILL DIRECT MOI_STON TN
LOOP TO SWITCH THE FOLLOWING
WHEN USED
LAUNCM TO LM POWERED PHASE
8 LM COAST PRIOR TO DPS MANEUVERo DOCKED LM/C&Mt CREW
TRANSFER, EMU ACTIVITY
7 LM OPS MANEUVER, CSH COAST
6 LM APS MANEUVER* CSM COAST
LM COAST AFTER APS MANEUVER* CSM SPS ll4ANEuVER
4 CSM ANALYS|S
Figure 5-6. - Sample of Flight Control Operations Handbook.
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PURPOSE :
PROCEDURE : A.
3 S/C: [_
- DATE: 3/27/69
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ORIGINATOR:APPROVAL :
0 2 QUANTITY CALCULATIONS
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Genera.! - The mass of a body of gms csm be determined by _tng the modified ga_ law formula
KP
M---
T R Z
where M • mass to be determlne_ In pounds
K • 8.91 for descent tank
• i._8 for • single mscent tank
P = Pressure in psla (GF358&P. OF3583P, GF3582P)
T R " (7C * _00)
Z = Ccnpresslbility FBctor obtained fY_m T_le 1 or from m chart of generLllzed
c_resslb_llty f&ctore. Z is inler%ed into the RTCC as a MED.
B. The LM ECS Engineer will inlert the ccapmlllbillty factor from TABLE 1 into the RTCC as
required. The factor for 70°F Is cor_14_red _q_te for the eEpected r_e of te_rn%lLre5.
TABLE I - 02 QUANTITY CALCULATIOS I_PbTS
DESCENT TANK
QU_IT_ (PotmDs) CgMPRESSIBI LITY
PRESSURE at
(PSIA) 60OF
2900 53.92
2700
25OO _6._8
23OO
2100 38.75
1900
1700 31.00
1500
1300 23.39
ii00
900 15.9_
7OO
500 8.66
300
i00 1.7"1
it
52._h 51._7
h8.83
h5.16 h3.85
nl. _2
37.73 36.6b
33.99
30,22 29.38
26. _
22.77 22.2h
19.15
15.57 15.21
12.00
8._9 8.33
5.05
1.68 1.65
(Z)
at 70°F
0.9_0
0.930
0.931
o .93_
o .936
0.9LO
0.9h6
o .95h
o. 960
o .966
o .972
0.981
o .990
0.998
i.o0
ASCENT TANK
PREssURE
(PSIA)
90O
7OO
5OO
3o0
io0
QUANTIT_ (POUNDS)
60°F 70°F F
2.61, 2.58 2.52
1.99
1.hh 1.hl 1.38
O. 8_
0.28 0.28 0.27
COMPRESSIBILITY
st 70°F
o.972
o.981
0.990
0.990
I. 00
Figure 5-7. - Sample of Flight Controller Console Handbook.
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FIGURE 3-10.
Remember a few frame| _o we said that the Moon revolves
around the Earth once every 27-1/3 days. If you think back,
you may realize that we neglected to say what this revolution
was with respect to, Well, now it can be told:
The Moon revolves around the Earth once every
27-i/3 days with respect to the stars.
I. other words, 27-i/_ days is the Moon's s_dereal perlod°
or sidereal month.
m IT. T_UE or FALSE? The Moon will be at the s_me right
ascension on the celestial sphere every 77-i,'_ days.
A_S-17: T_UE
Now let's put the Sun in the picture, as we have in
rlgure 3-10. A_ain, as when we illustrated solar amd sidereal
days in Section ], we have ex_gerated a bit for purposes
Of clarity. As shown, the time it takes for the Moon to
revolve once around the Earth with respec%to the Sun is
called the sn___q__erp.___, or synodic month. The Moon's
synodic period is approximately 29-i/2 days.
18. You would expect the phases of the Moon to be in step
with its (sidereal/synodic) period,
19, The Moon's right ascension would equal the Sun's rIEht
ascension once every -- (27-_/3 days_29-1/2 days),
Figure 5-8. - Sample of programed-instruction text.
During the remainder of the time, controllers worked with the flight crew space-
craft mission simulators. This promotes the integration of the flight control team and
the flight crew team. Simulation personnel introduce spacecraft and Manned Space
Flight Network problems and failures to test the documented procedures and mission
rules. Sometimes the simulations lead to changes in them. The time spent on each
period depends on its criticality and the amount of past experience available.
For an Apollo mission, simulations cover these periods of major activity: launch
through translunar injection; lunar orbit insertion; lunar module activation, checkout,
and descent; lunar surface operations; ascent through rendezvous; transearth injection;
and reentry.
We found in the Apollo Program that having groups specialize in these periods
gave better support. Thus, four teams divide the periods among themselves. Each
gets to know critical mission phases better, but does not have to spend such long hours
on the simulators.
The culmination of all this preparation follows lift-off. Throughout the Apollo
Program, approximately 80 percent of all problems encountered in flight, whether
large or small, had been previously discussed, documented, and simulated before
the flight. This made choosing the correct course of action almost automatic. The
remaining 20 percent of the problems readily yielded to the same logic, and decision-
making procedures followed to arrive at premission decisions. The logic of flight con-
trol decisions is diagramed in figure 5-9.
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PRO_DENIIF
FLIGHT CREW OBSERVATIONS
FLIGHI CONTROL REAL TIME OB_,ERVAIIONS
ANALY'_IS OF IAPE RECORDER PLAYB._,CKS
r RE NO ANALYSIS
•ANALY'_IS OF PRE_ISSIOR TESTER(,
COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS MISSION DATA
Figure 5-9. - Logic of flight
control decisions.
A functional organization has emerged
which is flexible enough to meet unexpected
problems, but is structured enough to pro-
vide continuity of operation from mission
to mission. The basic principles of flight
control are not unique to manned space
flight. They apply to any field where one
can visualize malfunctions, document solu-
tions, and rehearse the resulting actions.
They could find use in any field where one
monitors equipment or procedures by re-
mote sensing devices. Application of the
basic principles could increase efficiency
in any field where one can write standard
operating procedures. In the Apollo Pro-
gram, they helped carry man to the lunar
surface and bring him safely home again.
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, ACTION ON MISSION EVALUATION AND FLIGHT ANOMALIES
By Donald D. Arabian
Manned Spacecraft Center
The aim of mission evaluation is to extract the maximum amount of information
from each flight for use in managing and planning future missions and programs. Its
products also go before the scientific community and the public.
It is not surprising that a complex vehicle, such as a spacecraft, experiences
peculiarities and system problems that have not been considered previously. The
prime task of the mission evaluation team during a mission, therefore, involves iden-
tifying and understanding these peculiarities and problems and determining what action
should be taken. Mter a mission, the evaluation team also has responsibility for
(1) flight anomaly investigation and resolution and (2) preparation and publication of the
mission report.
For the mission evaluation, the many engineering disciplines involved in Apollo
are represented by groups of specialists, each managed by a NASA team leader. In
general, the specialists have experience with a particular system from the initial de-
sign conception through development and testing of the hardware. Consequently, they
have an intimate knowledge of the system operation and limitations. The specialists
are selected both from contractor and from NASA engineering organizations and work
as an integrated team. Before a mission, the selected team participates in certain
simulations with Mission Control Center personnel. This training serves to integrate
the two organizations into a single operational unit.
The responsibility of each team leader includes coordination with other team
leaders to ensure that any solution or recommended course of action for his system
does not jeopardize other systems. The team leaders report to the evaluation team
manager, who is responsible for the overall operation of the team. The team manager
is assisted by senior contractor engineering managers who have immediate access to
the company facilities to provide any necessary support. All inputs and requests by
the team leaders are integrated and reviewed by the team manager and by contractor
engineering management. The team manager interfaces with the Flight Director
through the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager. During a mission, the team mans
assigned positions in the mission evaluation room (fig. 6-1) around the clock.
To support the mission evaluation team effort at the NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center (MSC), the prime contractors maintain similar teams of specialists at their fa-
cilities for analyses, tests, and related activities. These contractor teams are also
under the direct management of the mission evaluation team at MSC.
A typical example of the activity associated with these supporting teams occurred
when a lightning discharge on Apollo 12 caused the loss of inertial reference (tumbling)
of the inertial platform. In this instance, the support team at the Massachusetts
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Figure 6-1.- Mission evaluation room with team leaders' table in the foreground
and discussion of a system problem in the background.
Institute of Technologyperformed a test to simulate the conditions so that it could be
understoodhow the potential discharge causedthe platform to tumble. It was important
to have rapid verification that the platform had not beendamaged. A quick response
was received by the evaluationteam, and the mechanism that had causedthe conditions
in flight was determined.
Manyother times during Apollo flights, the evaluation team hasprovided test in-
formation that was valuable in understandinga problem and determining the best course
of corrective action. In carrying out its task, the team must be constantly aware of
the total system performance as the mission progresses. The team monitors data that
are received by the tracking stations, transmitted to andprocessed by the Mission Con-
trol Center, and displayed in the Mission Evaluation Room on closed-circuit television.
In addition, air-to-ground voice communicationsare monitored.
The frequency of the Apollo flights demandsthat anomalies bequickly identified
and resolved so that prompt corrective action may be taken. Analysis of the data for
problems and anomalies must be compressed, therefore, into a relatively short period.
Also, within this time frame, the anomalies must be analyzedto the extent that the
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mechanismassociated with the cause is clearly understood. Of course, anomalies
which involve flight safety or which wouldcompromise the mission require corrective
action before the next flight.
The first problem is to identify the anomalies. Manyanomalies are easily rec-
ognized becausea componenthas failed to operate. The most difficult cases, however,
appearwhenthe data from the system are not sufficient for an understandingof all the
normal operating characteristics. A typical exampleof this condition occurred during
the Apollo 7 mission whenthe battery recharging characteristics fell belowpredicted
levels throughout the flight. Preflight tests had beenconductedat the componentlevel,
but an integrated test of the entire system, as installed in the spacecraft, hadnot been
included. Postflight tests, using the actual flight hardware, showedthe same charac-
teristics as those experienced in flight. A detailed analysis showedthat the line resist-
ance betweencomponentsof the system greatly controlled the amountof energy returned
to the battery. The corrective action for this anomalywas to require that integrated
system tests beperformed to establish overall system characteristics of each installa-
tion andthus ensure adequatebattery recharging. In this case, if the total system op-
erating characteristics had beenestablished previously, there would have beenno
problem.
Sometimes, also, data will not support an accurate analysis of a problem. This
situation occurs becauseof insufficient flight instrumentation or absenceof recorded
data. The mission evaluation team, in attempting to focus on the anomalouscondition,
must rely on the history compiled from previous missions and on the experience gained
from tests andcheckout andknowledgeof the failure history.
After an anomaly is identified, the causeand the corrective action must be iden-
tified. The approachmay be experimental or analytical or both.
The depthand the extent of the analysis vary considerably and dependon the sig-
nificance of the problem. For example, on the Apollo 6 mission, a structural failure
occurred in the adapter that holds the service module to the launchvehicle and also
housesthe lunar moduleduring the ascent portion of the flight. This adapter consists
of the largest honeycombstructure designedand developedfor any application. Long-
range photographsshowthat the structure lost the outer face sheet from the honeycomb-
sandwichpanel by explosive separation. (Seefig. 6-2. ) Responseto the effects was
obtainedfrom manymeasurements in the commandand service module, lunar module,
and launchvehicle.
In resolving this problem, four possible causeswere investigated: structural
dynamics of the launchvehicle, the dynamic loads of the lunar module, dynamic modes
of the adapter shell itself, and quality of manufacture.
The investigation first focused onanunderstanding of the coupled vibration modes
and characteristics of the launchvehicle and spacecraft. Extensive vibration tests
ruled out vibration as a cause.
Further tests andanalyses indicated that the internal pressure of the sandwich
panels could have causedthe failure. If a large unbondedarea existed betweenthe hon-
eycomband the face sheets, then aerodynamic heating of the air and moisture entrapped
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in the panel could have causeda pressure
buildup in the honeycomb, separating the
face sheets in an explosive manner. The
most probable causeof this condition was
traced to the manufacturing process (the
possibility of unbondedface sheets remain-
ing undetected). To circumvent the prob-
lem in the future, the inspection procedures
for the structure were changed. Also, cork
wasplaced on the outer surface of theadap-
ter to reduce aerodynamic heating, and
small vent holes were drilled through the
inner face sheet into the honeycombto re-
duceinternal pressure.
Figure 6-2. - Long-range photography
of adapter failure during the
Apollo 6 mission.
Analysis of this anomaly involved
testing full-size equipmentunder dynamic
and static conditions, performing many ex-
perimental tests of smaller test articles,
and conductingextensive structural analy-
sis at the various NASAcenters andat
many contractor organizations. This effort
verified that the structural integrity of the
adapter was satisfactory for subsequent
missions and established that the failure
wasnot causedby a design deficiency.
The other extreme of treating a problem concerns anomalies for which no cor-
rective action is taken becauseof the nature of the failure. For example, on the
Apollo 11entry-monitor system, an electroluminescent segmentof the velocity counter
would not illuminate. A generic or design problem was highly unlikely becauseof the
number of satisfactory activations experiencedup to that time. A circuit analysis pro-
duceda number of mechanisms that could causethis failure, but there was no failure
history in any of these areas. This case is a typical example of a random failure.
The basic design concept of the spacecraft overrides suchfailures by providing alter-
nate procedures or redundantequipment. Consequently, this type of failure does not
demandcorrective action.
Causesof anomalies involve quality, design, and procedures. The quality items
include broken wires, improper solder joints, incorrect tolerances, improper manu-
facturing procedures, and so forth. The structural failure of the adapter on the
Apollo 6 mission, previously discussed, illustrates such a quality problem.
Systemanomalies causedby designdeficiencies can generally be traced to insuf-
ficient design criteria. Consequently, the deficiency canpass developmentand quali-
fication testing without being detected, but will appear during flight under the actual
operational environment. A typical exampleof a design deficiency is the fogging of the
Apollo 7 commandmodulewindows betweenthe inner surfaces of the three window
panes. A postflight examination showedthe fogging to be a product of the outgassing
of the room-temperature-cured sealing material used around the window. The design
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criteria did not require the sealing material to be cured; curing would haveprevented
outgassingin the operating temperature and pressure environment.
Procedural problems in operating various systems and equipmentare ordinarily
corrected simply. For example, an incorrect procedure wasused to chlorinate the
crew's drinking water. This resulted in an improper mixing of the chlorine andwater,
giving the water a strong chlorine taste. The procedure was revised, and the water
no longer had an objectionable taste.
While a mission is in progress, the scopeof a problem must be definedbefore
action is taken; that is, the problem must be isolated to the extent of establishing pos-
sible effects on the spacecraft systems. Every effort is concentratedondeveloping a
procedure that permits the mission to continuedespite the problem. Completeunder-
standingand analysis of the problem frequently require postflight data analysis, crew
debriefings, or testing of the spacecraft hardware.
When lunar modulehardware exhibits a problem, it may be returned for postflight
analysis andtesting, provided the commandmodulehas stowagespace available and the
lunar modulegear fits the space. For example, the color television camera that failed
on the lunar surface during the Apollo 12mission was scheduledto be left on the lunar
surface but was returned to earth for postflight testing.
Whenpostflight testing cannotbe donebecausethe hardware cannot be returned
to earth (e. g., the lunar moduleand service modulehardware), every effort is made
to perform inflight tests to understand and isolate the cause of the failure. A typical
caseoccurred during the Apollo 12mission whenthe high-gain antenna, mountedon
the service module, occasionally exhibited reduction in signal strength. The evaluation
team developeda test to isolate the anomaly to specific areas andcomponentsof the
high-gain-antenna system. The test, conductedlater in the mission, produced data
which, combinedwith analysis, isolated the cause.
An additional search for anomalies is conductedwhenthe commandmodule is re-
turned to the contractor's facility for a general inspection. Those systems and com-
ponents identified as having a problem or failure are removedfrom the vehicle and
tested to establish the cause, or tests are performed with the affected equipment in po-
sition in the commandmodule. In general, these postflight tests are limited to those
required for anunderstanding of flight problems.
The concerted effort onanomalies during the flight continuesafter the mission
until eachproblem is resolved and corrective action is taken. This activity requires
close coordination and cooperation betweenthe various Governmentandcontractor
groups. Emphasis is placed onprompt and exact analysis for the understanding and
timely solution of eachproblem.
To accomplish this task, a problem list is maintained during and after each flight.
This list contains a discussion of eachproblem, the action being taken to resolve it, the
engineer or contractor responsible for completing the action, andthe anticipated clo-
sure date.
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After the flight, the most significant anomalies are published in the 30-Day Anom-
aly and Failure Listing Report. This report identifies the anomaly, discusses the anal-
ysis, and identifies the corrective action to be taken. The Mission Report, which is
publishedapproximately 60days after a flight, includes a section which discusses all
significant anomalies and corrective actions. The less significant problems are dis-
cussedin the appropriate sections of the Mission Report. A separate report covers
anomalies not resolved before publication of the Mission Report. The Mission Report
serves as anhistorical record of the pertinent events of the mission and includes dis-
cussions of systems performance, crew activities, flight anomalies, and scientific ex-
periments. Supplementsto the Mission Report are published to present detailed
analysis of the engineering systems,medical aspects, andscientific aspects of the
mission.
The techniquesused in Apollo for assessingsystems performance reflect signifi-
cant advancementsover thoseused in previous mannedprograms. The methodof han-
dling flight anomalies, including the depthand extent of analysis, has beensufficient
for the time and economyconstraints imposedby the program. The Apollo concepthas
proved to be very effective in organizing manycontractors andfederal organizations
into one central team for the real-time support andpostflight evaluation of each mis-
sion. Theseconcepts enabledthe Apollo Program to advanceat the rate required to
achieve the national goal of landing man on the moonbefore 1970.
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. TECHNI QUES 0 F CONTROLLI NG THE TRAJECTORY
By Howard W. Tindall, Jr.
Manned Spacecraft Center
Someone not associated with the Apollo Program cannot imagine how much plan-
ning precedes each mission. Planning is truly an immense task, which takes many dif-
ferent forms. Basically, this is another report about mission planning. It is not about
the selection of launch windows, trajectories to be flown, landing sites, or how to make
the lighting conditions right. Neither does this report specifically involve preplanning
the crew time line; defining when pieces of equipment should be turned on, when the crew
should sleep, eat, work, perform on TV; and so forth. The planning this report is con-
cerned with does interact intimately with these, but it is planning of an entirely different
type. Generally speaking, it is the planning required to define how the trajectory is con-
trolled once the mission objectives, trajectory plan, and crew time line have been
established: to figure out exactly how the various components of the guidance, naviga-
tion, and control (GNC) systems and, to some extent, the engines are to be used during
all phases of each of the manned Apollo missions.
Unquestionably, activities associated with trajectory control constitute by far the
largest piece of operational overhead in any Apollo mission. That is, in the process of
achieving the real objectives of a lunar-landing mission (such as placing experiments on
the lunar surface, picking up rocks, and taking pictures) you will find no other inflight
activity that approaches trajectory control in its capacity to absorb planning and training
energy. Usually, when conflicts arise, the trajectory-control activity takes priority
over everything else, such as systems management, crew work and rest'cycles, and
experiments (including the lunar-surface work).
Since trajectory-control activities make up such a large part of every Apollo mis-
sion, the manner of conducting them has an impact on almost every other facet of the
mission, even on aspects that seem remote, such as electrical-power management,
thermal control, and consumable budgeting. As a result, it is necessary to consider
all of these things in the development of the overall trajectory-control procedures,
which we call mission techniques. Also, it is important that almost everyone in the
Apollo world knows how we intend to do these things, since we often impact their plans.
One basic characteristic in the design of the overall Apollo guidance and naviga-
tion (G&N) system must be recognized before I proceed. Namely, the ground-based
tracking, computation, and control-center facilities not only form an integral part of
the G&N system -- being the prime source of essential data to the spacecraft systems --
but in some instances, the ground will be the only source of data. Specifically, with the
exception of rendezvous and inertial sensing during maneuvers, all trajectory determi-
nation is done on the ground. This is the task of determining the position and velocity of
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the spacecraft and its relation to where we are trying to go-- braking into lunar orbit,
trying to land at a specific site on the moon, hitting the earth atmospheric-entry corri-
dor, or whatever.
Also, with the exceptionof the rendezvous, the ground is the only source of ma-
neuver targeting. By maneuver targeting, I meanthe task of figuring out the exact
magnitudeanddirection andthe time at which each maneuvermust be executedin order
to perform the mission.
The two essential functions, orbit determination andtargeting, cannotbe per-
formed on board the spacecraft. The reason I am making sucha big point aboutthis is
probably obvious. Putting together mission techniqueswith a G&N system like that is
much more complicated that if the whole job could be doneon beard the spacecraft
without external assistance. A tremendousamount of data must be relayed back and
forth betweenthe spacecraft andthe ground, and the contentandformat of these data
haveto be complete and precisely compatible. Also, instead of only the three crew-
members being involved in the operation -- that is, understandingand carrying it out
we must involve the entire flight-control complex. This makes the inflight job, of
course, more complicated -- but, believe me, it makesthe planning job something
else, too. Manydiverse opinions aboutthe planningtask are expressedwithout hesita-
tion or inhibition.
There is an important point I would like to make regarding operational philosophy,
since it influences the mission techniquesso much. It mustbe obvious from the way
the missions have goneso far that the spacecraft equipmentis really put together right.
A tremendous amountof attention hasbeendevotedto designandtesting to make sure
that everything will work as it is supposedto. On top of that, in order to provide even
more confidencethat the mission may be conductedsuccessfully and safely, all of the
critical systems are backedup by other systems. (In the GNCarea, the backupsys-
tems, without exception, are of an entirely different design than the primary systems.
Thus, they are operated entirely differently, which almost doublesthe planning.)
Accordingly, you might think that the mission techniquesfor a spacecraft like
Apollo wouldbe basedon the assumptionthat the equipmentwill work. The fact is,
however -- right or wrong -- that our operational planningon all mannedspaceflights
so far has beenbasedon a philosophyof cross-checking and monitoring every critical
system and operation to make sure that the systems are performing properly.
Operations must all be plannedout before a mission -- just whatwill be doneif
the primary or backupsystem (or both) fails or is degraded. Also, we must plan what
can bedonewith whatever componentsof these systems might still beworking, with the
data shippedfrom the groundand from charts and simple mathematical techniquesde-
velopedfor the crew, and with any other data sources not ordinarily used, such as the
view out the windows.
On the other hand, whenyou consider that we deploy two sophisticated spacecraft,
each of which hasextensive capabilities, the imagination explodeswith the possible
ways things could be doneas various componentsfail. Also, whenyoumultiply this
multitude of choices by the number of uniquely different phasesin a lunar-landing mis-
sion, you find that the task of developing the techniquescould expandindefinitely. Ob-
viously, if unconstrained, this whole businesscould get out of hand. Not only could it
6O
causean inexcusable waste of resources, but it could also introduce a myriad of com-
plicated procedures -- tier upon tier of alternate modes of operation which would go
beyond the ability of the crew and flight controllers to understand, train with, and use.
These two rules bound the problem: Be prepared to recognize and react under
any condition to save the crew and the mission, but do not carry this business to the
point of actually reducing reliability by introducing confusion or the incomprehensible
into the system. If I were to look back and judge how we actually did on Apollo, I would
say we went a little too far -- not much, but some. And, of course, it is easier to look
back.
The Mission-Technique Development Task: How do you decide how to fly an Apol-
lo mission? If the inertial reference system is drifting a little, what do you do about
it? If it drifts a lot, what do you do about that? What is the switchover point between a
"little" and a "lot"? Let us say you are in the middle of a rendezvous with a maneuver
coming up and you have three sources of data each telling you what the maneuver should
be. Also, your friend in the other spacecraft has a solution, as do the people on the
ground. How do you choose among these solutions, if they differ ? It is specific ques-
tions like these -- and there are literally hundreds of them -- that the mission-technique
development process was set up to answer to everyone's satisfaction. Let me describe
the development process and its products.
First of all, the task involves pinning down precisely how well the systems must
work or if they are even needed to achieve mission success or to assure crew safety.
This can become a tough job. Certainly, we do not want to abort a mission if it is safe
to continue, but we must be sure it is safe, even if something else fails. To some ex-
tent, the decisions depend on where you are in the mission.
For example, we had as an Apollo 11 mission rule that we would not separate the
lunar module (LM) from the command and service module (CSM) in lunar orbit if the
rendezvous radar was not working. We felt that our lunar-orbit experience and LM sys-
tems maturity were not adequate at that time to start intentionally a rendezvous situation
without the rendezvous radar. On the other hand, after the two spacecraft had been
separated and descent had started, there was no reason to terminate the mission
because of a rendezvous-radar failure. By that time, we would already be committed
ourselves to performing the rendezvous without it and so might as well press on. Thus,
some mission techniques can be chosen by applying common sense to the situation.
Table 7-I illustrates one of the mission-technique products dealing with this kind of
situation by listing which pieces of equipment must be working to continue at several
go/no-go points in lunar orbit.
If a piece of equipment is obviously broken, it is easy to apply the mission rules
agreed to before flight, such as those given in table 7-I. However, if it is just not
working up to par, then what? In this case, the go/no-go decision must reflect system
requirements in terms of the mission phase.
A good example of this was the preparation for the LM descent to the lunar surface
on Apollo 11. Although all three gyroscopes in the primary guidance system inertial
platform have identical design, the performance required of each was markedly differ-
ent. Analysis showed that a misalinement about the pitch axis as large as 1° does not
degrade the descent guidance unacceptably as long as the landing radar is working, but
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TABLE 7-I. - MANDATORY GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
(a) Lunar module systems
LM systems
Primary GNC system:
LM guidance computer
Inertial measurement
unit
Display and keyboard
Abort guidance system
Control electronics
system
Descent propulsion
subsystem
Rendezvous radar
Landing radar
Flight director attitude
indicator
Alinement optical telescope
f
Hand controllers
Flashing light on LM
Undocking and
separation a
R b
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R d
R
R
NR
Descent orbit
insertion
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R d
NR e
R
R
Power descent
initiate
R
R
R
R
R
R
NR c
R
R d
NR
R
R
aThe separation maneuver and mini-football activities will be performed for all condi-
tions allowing undocking.
bRequired.
CNot required.
dOnly one unit is required.
eAlinement optical telescope is required until the pre-descent-orbit-insertion fine
alinement is completed.
fTranslation and at least one rotation hand controller.
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TABLE 7-I. - MANDATORY GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL SYSTEMS - Concluded
(b) Command and service module systems
CSM systems
GNC system :
CM computer
Inertial measurement unit
Display and keyboard
Optics:
Sextant
Scanning telescope
Crewman optical
alinement sight
Stabilization and control
system :
Body-mounted attitude
gyroscopes
Gyroscope display coupler
Flight director attitude
indicator
Service propulsion system
Hand controllers
Entry monitor system change-
in-velocity counters
Very-high-frequency ranging
Rendezvous radar transponder
Undocking and
separation a
R b
R
R
R
R
R
R d
Descent orbit
insertion
R
R
R
R
R
R
R d
Power descent
initiate
NR c
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
R
R e
R I
R
NR
NR
R
R
NR
NR
R
R
R e
R f
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
aThe separation maneuver and mini-football activities will be performed for all condi-
tions allowing undocking.
bRequired.
CNot required.
done set of body-mounted attitude gyroscopes required.
eonly one unit is required.
fir service propulsion system has failed, transearth injection will be performed at the
next opportunity.
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that just a 0.5 ° misalinement renders the guidancesystem incapableof performing a
safe abort from the descenttrajectory. Sowe establishedsafe-abort ability as the
criterion for computing the limiting pitch-axis gyroscopeperformance. Specifically,
since the system is alined approximately anhour and a half before powered descent,
we were able to fix 0.33 deg/hr as the maximum acceptablegyroscopepitch rate (the
3oApollo gyroscopeperformance is 0.1 deg/hr).
On the Apollo 11 mission, very large misalinements could be tolerated in yaw
and roll. In fact, there wasno reason not to continueunless one of these two gyro-
scopesdrifted more than 1.5 deg/hr -- the value determined by the gyroscopeexperts
as an indication that the system is broken. In other words, a failure limit imposeda
tighter constraint than anyperformance requirement; therefore, failure becamethe
yaw and roll gyroscopecriterion.
This will not be the caseon Apollo 13, where the landing will take place in ex-
tremely rough terrain with a limited safe-landing area. Both mission successand crew
safety dependon the guidancesystem getting the LM to within 1 kilometer of the aiming
point. Accordingly, it is necessary to reduce the maximum allowable drift rate about
the inertially vertical axis from the failure-criteria value of 1.5 to 0. 145deg/hr (i. e.,
10 times better performance than wasneededon the earlier missions). The job in each
case is to find the most constraining criterion andthe limits associatedwith it.
Oncewe set limits like these, we can thendefine precise crew and ground-support
procedures for verifying that the performance comeswithin the limits before reaching
eachmission go/no-go decision point. It is also necessary to decidewhat to do if the
performance does not fall betweenthe limits. In the nonfailure cases just mentioned,
it is possible to reload new drift-compensation values into the spacecraft computer by
a commandup link from the ground. In the failure case (i. e., 1.5-deg/hr drift onany
of the three gyroscopes), the only choice is to "no-go" the descent.
Mission techniquesalso involve defining the procedures for monitoring systems
during critical mission phases; for example, in powered flight, where an unsafe situa-
tion candevelopvery quickly. Theway of doing this follows the pattern described for
system-performance tests.
To illustrate, I have pulled the flow chart shownin figure 7-1 from one of our
documents. It describes part of the decision logic followed by the ground flight control-
lers whomonitor the lunar descent. The flow chart showsthe steps to be taken under
each condition in monitoring the guidanceand control systems. The diagram is not
meant to be followed stepby step, but rather is a guide for the flight controllers, who
monitor various parameters on strip charts. The flow chart gives the procedures to be
followed if certain limits are exceeded.
Monitoring another type of critical phasemust also beworked out. During lunar-
orbit rendezvous, we haveno fewer than five first-class systems computing the rendez-
vous maneuvers. The LM has its primary guidancesystem anda backupguidance
system; the CSMhasan excellent system, and the groundcando a very goodjob too.
In addition to those, the crew cando the same job with some charts and simple paper-
and-pencil calculations. The rendezvousis probably thebest exampleof where a job
we call "data priority" had to be applied. It is clear how the maneuversshouldbe exe-
cuted if all of thesedata sources agreewith one another, but how shouldyou respond
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if they do not ? Many hours of discussion were spent in pinning down such basics as
what we mean by "agreement" (e. g., within 0.1, 1.0, or 10 fps for velocity) and, if
things do not agree, which one should be used?
We also produce mission-technique documents for every phase of every manned
Apollo flight. The mission-technique documents describe precisely how all of this is
done and the reasons for doing it that way. The documents are widely distributed to
make sure everyone knows what we plan to do. But most important, all of these tech-
niques are included in Crew Procedures, Checklist, Flight Plan, Flight Control Pro-
cedures, and Mission Rules --the documents which truly govern the conduct of the
mission.
Development of mission techniques was achieved by assigning to an individual in
the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office the responsibility of coordinating the activities
of the various groups working on those things so that when they were finished, there
was some assurance they would all be compatible, complete, and universally
understood.
Of course, the way we got this job done was with meetings --big meetings, little
meetings, hundreds of meetings! The thing we always tried to do in these meetings
was to encourage everyone, no matter how shy, to speak out, hopefully (but not always)
without being subjected to ridicule. We wanted to make sure we had not overlooked any
legitimate input.
One thing we found to be very effective --and which we almost always did _ was
to make decisions on how to do the job, even if the data available were incomplete or
conflicting, or if there was substantial disagreement among the participants. This
even included making educated guesses at the performance abort limits and stating
that they were the values we would use unless someone came in with something better.
However, do not get me wrong. These limits are a very serious business. They lit-
erally define the point at which a mission will be aborted. You can imagine how emo-
tional our meetings frequently were!
Although the decisions reached often displeased someone, the fact that a decision
had been made was invaluable. Since this effort was officially sanctioned, the decisions
served to unify all subsequent work. They often also pointed up the need for more
work. And for those dissatisfied with the decisions, at least they presented a firm
target which they could attack through recognized channels to higher authority.
In short, the primary purpose of these meetings was to make decisions, and we
never hesitated! These early decisions provided a point of departure; and by the time
the flight took place, our numbers were firm, checked, and double-checked. By then,
we knew they were right!
Mission-Technique Spinoffs: There were several important spinoffs from this
work. The meetings were regularly attended by experts involved in all facets of tra-
jectory control -- systems, computer, and operations people, including the crew. Our
discussions not only resulted in agreement among everyone as to how we planned to do
the job and why, but also inevitably educated everyone as to precisely how the systems
themselves work, down to the last detail. A characteristic of Apollo you could not help
noting was just how great the lack of detailed and absolute comprehension are on a
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program of this magnitude. There is a basic communicationproblem for which I can
offer no acceptable solution. To do our job, we needed a level of detailed understand-
ing of the functioning of systems and software far greater than was generally available.
Through our meetings, however, we forced this understanding. It was not easy, but
we got it sorted out eventually m together.
Another valuable spinoff from these discussions was the state of readiness
achieved by the operations people m ground and crew -- before starting simulation
training exercises. By the time we had finished our work, everyone had a pretty gooci
idea of exactly what we were trying to do and how we were going to do it -- exactly
what was expected of each individual and when. And, most important, the data flow
between ground and spacecraft would have been defined and scheduled in detail. As a
result, when simulations began, they could proceed with maximum efficiency doing
exactly what they were intended to do -- train people. Interruptions and false starts to
get things squared away were kept to a minimum, usually just involving those things
that had not occurred to us previously or which did not work out too well in actual
practice. I cannot overemphasize the importance of this, since obtaining adequate
training is one of the toughest jobs we have.
A third spinoff involves the inevitable discovery of system deficiencies. When
you get a gang of people like these together to figure out exactly how you are going to
do the trajectory-control job, it is inevitable that really outstanding new ideas will
emerge. These new ideas caused a large number of spacecraft and control-center
computer-program changes, both additions and _ I am pleased to report -- deletions.
We also uncovered undesirable or even unacceptable hardware characteristics. We
were able to get some fixed. We took it upon ourselves to advertise the rest exten-
sively and to plan workaround procedures.
The greatest impact on an area, outside of mission techniques, involved trajec-
tory planning. As we worked out the details, it was found advisable to make substan-
tial changes in lunar-orbit rendezvous, lunar descent aborts, and entry through the
earth atmosphere, as well as many less significant things, such as performing the
lunar-orbit insertion in two steps instead of one and, starting with Apollo 13, doing the
descent-orbit insertion maneuver with the CSM instead of the LM.
These changes were usually made when it was found that suitable monitoring tech-
niques were not available or that it was necessary to make the mission more compatible
with the backup techniques. For example, there are two levels of backup to the primary
G&N system of the CSM for atmospheric entry at the conclusion of a lunar mission.
However, neither of the backups can support the long-range entry involving skipping out
of the atmosphere, which was originally planned for Apollo missions to avoid bad
weather and was the standard mode the primary guidance system was designed to fly.
Accordingly, to permit switchover of systems if the primary G&N failed during entry,
the trajectory plan was changed and the G&N was modified to fly the nonskip trajectory
we now use on all lunar flights.
How has this all worked out now that we have essentially finished it7 Well, I
have to confess that, as far as I know, there was never an instance in any of the Apollo
flights where the detailed system test and monitoring we set up uncovered anything un-
acceptable. That is, we could have flown with our eyes closed, and the primary guid-
ance system would have come through. The work we were originally set up to do has
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never savedus from catastrophe, althoughI am sure it must have reducedanxieties by
several orders of magnitude. As far as the usefulnessof the overall effort, I really do
not seehow we could have flown the missions without its havingbeendone. The spin-
offs alone were worth it.
68
8. FLEXIBLE YET DISCIPLINED MISSION PLANNING
By C. C. Kraft, Jr., J. P. Mayer, C. R. Huss, and R. P. Parten
Manned Spacecraft Center
Apollo mission planning extended over a period of approximately 8 years and en-
compassed many technical disciplines. It progressed from the early design-reference
lunar mission in 1962 through the detailed operational planning of specific missions
which began in 1964. A pattern of mission-planning procedures, techniques, and man-
agement processes evolved that brought order to the many (and sometimes diverse)
elements of the mission-planning team. This report examines the Apollo mission-
planning process, the important considerations that influenced the mission planners,
and the evolution of the Apollo development flight schedule. The report concludes with
a brief description of the more important panels, meetings, and working groups that
helped to coordinate the mission-planning activities.
The planning and design of a mission, like the development of spacecraft hard-
ware, proceeds from previously specified objectives and becomes constrained by sys-
tem characteristics and operational considerations. Fundamentally, the process
consists of a series of iterative cycles (fig. 8-1) in which a design is defined to increas-
ingly finer levels of detail as the program progresses and as the flight hardware and
operational considerations become better known.
pose of transforming broad objectives into
a standard profile and sequence of events
against which the space-vehicle systems
can be designed. Usually, incompatibili-
ties arise immediately between system
design and mission design, and these ne-
cessitate trade-off studies to arrive at a
compromise. Later, as hardware design
solidifies, the emphasis of mission design
becomes more operationally oriented, as
the mission planners attempt to constrain
their design to the operating capabilities
of the space vehicles, ground-support fa-
cilities, and flight software. The final
planning phase, which occurs during the
year before a launch, involves develop-
ment of the detailed procedures, tech-
niques, and mission rules which are used
by the flight crew and ground control team
for both nominal and contingency missions.
Initially, mission design has the pur-
¢ GROUND SUPPORT
GROUND- AND AI ffBORN[
I OESIG_ I
l
Figure 8-1.- Iterative mission-planning
process.
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MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS
The considerations important to Apollo mission planners depended somewhat on
the type of mission: manned or unmanned, development or operational. Fo_ manned
missions, the prime consideration was crew safety, whereas unmanned missions
stressed mission success. For development missions, the prime consideration was
to maximize the number of testobjectives that could be met successfully, as opposed to
operational missions, in which the number of finalmission objectiveswas maximized.
The need for early decisions made the Apollo mission planners the driving force
in stating the requirements for collecting and documenting all constraints. This
need existed particularly during the development phase of the program. After the con-
straints were obtained, the development of mission techniques that would achieve the
required test or mission objectives within them was necessary. This development
proved to be an iterativeprocess which involved constraints, techniques, and objectives.
Itusually was carried to the time of finalmission rules and flightplans. The iteration
process and the consideration of possible failures or contingency situationsentailed
much alternate mission and contingency mission planning. This type of planning activ-
ity reached a peak during the manned development missions.
Because of involvement early in the planning stage of a mission, the mission
planners have been able to affect materially the development of both onboard and ground
software. In many cases, the software had to be tailored to a specific mission, al-
though every effort was made to use the final program software wherever possible.
The software development schedule and costs can (and did) influence the design
of some missions. In the early days of Apollo, separate programs were being developed
for the unmanned Saturn IB and Saturn V test missions, because of distinct differences
in the test requirements for the missions. Later, it became apparent that the develop-
ment of several different spacecraft- and ground-software programs was not feasible,
considering the schedule and costs for delivering the lunar-landing-mission program.
Because of this, the Saturn V mission test objectives were reexamined and were modi-
fied to accept the software used for the Saturn IB missions.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING CYCLE
Usually, the Apollo operational planning cycle began between 36 and 18 months
before a launch, depending on the extent of mission complexity. Because several orga-
nizations within NASA and throughout industry were participating in the analysis and
design of the Apollo development and lunar missions, a need was identified for coordi-
nating the efforts of all mission-planning elements.
In late 1964, an Apollo Mission Trajectory Documentation Plan was prepared,
which defined the principal documents and information flow in the areas of mission plan-
ning and trajectory analysis. This plan became a major vehicle for coordinating the
more significant mission-planning milestones throughout the Apollo Program.
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The operational mission designwas divided into three separate phases: mission
definition, mission design, andflight preparation. Schedulesfor the beginning and
termination of eachphasewere established specifically to dovetail with the major hard-
ware development, airborne- and ground-software development, and crew-training
milestones.
Although eachphasesometimes specified as manyas 20 major milestones (docu-
ments), the nucleusof the plan involved only four basic milestones for eachphase: a
mission requirements document, an operational databook, a trajectory plan, and of
course a flight plan. The remainder of the milestones concernedabort and contingency
planning, dispersion analyses, consumablesanalyses, andother special requirements,
suchas range-safety plans, orbital-debris studies, onboard-data-file information, and
crew- simulator data.
Early in the Apollo Program, considerable difficulty was experienced in the ex-
change, standardization, and dissemination of critical data required both by andfrom
the mission planners. In view of the interdependencyof most mission-planning mile-
stonedocuments, the needfor coordination and tight control in disseminating thesedata
becameacute. As a result, the Apollo SpacecraftProgram Office in conjunctionwith
the hardware contractors and operational elements exercised strict controls andpro-
cedures in governing mission-planning data. As a part of this program, most organi-
zations appointedkey personnel on a full-time basis to support the data-management
network. In retrospect, this action must be regarded as vital in consolidating and
strengthening the Apollo mission-planning process.
Thenext step in the Apollo operational planning cycle involves what came to be
knownas mission techniques, which were developedin the form of logic flows that de-
tail each decision point, threshold value, and ground rule for eachphaseof both nom-
inal andcontingency missions. Section 7 discusses mission techniquesin somedetail.
In Apollo, as any other complex spacemission, it is virtually impossible to de-
velop premission plans for every contingencythat could arise during flight. Although
specific plans are developedfor all abort potentialities that involve crew safety, most
alternate missions are developedona class basis by using the alternate test and mis-
sion objectives. However, the real-time mission planner is given a powerful assort-
ment of mission-planning computer programs that enhancehis ability to manageany
contingency. By the proper use of these on-line computer programs, alternate mis-
sion plans can be developedin real time and can thereby augmentthe premission plan-
ning activities.
DEVELOPMENTFLIGHT SCHEDULE
To understand the complexity of the task of mission planning for the Apollo Pro-
gram, the evolvement of the development flight schedule may be reviewed. From the
beginning of the Apollo Program, it was recognized that the flight tests for verifying
hardware design, hardware performance, and operational techniques would be exten-
sive. At the same time, it was recognized that the cost and scheduling of such flights
must be controlled and limited to keep development costs for the program at a minimum.
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Test requirements for the major hardware elements (launch-escapesystem, com-
mand moduleaerodynamics, spacecraft structural verification, thermal-protection
system, separation systems, communications systems, propulsive systems, landing
systems, etc. ) were recognized early as tests that could be madeby unmannedflight
vehicles. This realization resulted in the series of Little Joe II test flights (launched
at the NASAWhite SandsTest Facility) and in three Saturn IB andtwo SaturnV test
flights (launchedat the NASAJohn F. KennedySpaceCenter), which can be notedin
table 8-I.
TABLE 8-I. - APOLLO SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY
Mission
PA- 1 BP- 6
A-001 BP-12
AS-101 BP-13
AS-102 BP-15
AS-002 BP-23
AS- 103 BP- 16
A-003 BP-22
AS- 104 BP-26
PA-2 BP-23A
AS- 105 BP-9A
A- 004 SC- 002
AS-201 SC- 009
AS-202 SC-011
Apollo 4 SC-017
LTA- 10R
Apollo 5 LM- 1
Apollo 6 SC-020
Apollo 7 CSM 101
Apollo 8 CSM 103
Apollo 9 CSM 104
LM-3
Apollo 10 CSM 106
LM-4
Apollo 1I CSM 107
LM- 5
Apollo 12 CSM 108
LM-6
Spacecraft Description Launch date Launch site
First pad abort
Transonic abort
Nominal launch and exit environment
Nominal launch and exit environment
Maximum dynamic pressure abort
Micromet enfold experiment
Low-altitude abort (planned high-altitude abort)
Micrometeoroid experiment and service
module reaction control system launch
environment
Second pad abort
Micrometeoroid experiment and service
module reaction control system launch
environment
Power-on tumbling boundary abort
Supercircular entry with high heat rate
Supercircular entry with high heat load
Supercircular entry at lunar return velocity
First lunar module flight
Verification of closed-loop emergency
detection system
First manned flight; earth orbital
First manned lunar orbital flight: first
manned Saturn V launch
First manned lunar module flight; earth orbit
rendezvous: extravehicular activity
First lunar orbit rendezvous: low pass over
lunar surface
First lunar landing
Second lunar landing
Nov. 7, 1963
May 13, 1964
May 28. 1964
Sept. 16, 1964
Dec. 8, 1964
Feb. 16, 1965
May 19. 1965
May 25. 1965
June 29. 1965
July 30. 1965
Jan. 20. 1966
Feb. 26, 1966
Aug. 25, 1966
Nov. 9, 1967
Jan. 22. 1968
April 4. 1968
Oct. 11. 1968
Dec. 21, 1966
March 3. 1969
May 18, 1969
July 16, 1969
Nov. 14, 1969
White Sands Missile Range, N, Mex.
White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex.
Kennedy Space Center, Fla.
Kennedy Space Center. Fla.
White Sands Missile Range. N. Mex.
Kennedy Space Center. Fla.
White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex.
Kennedy Space Center. Fla.
White Sands Missile Range. N. Mex.
K_nnedy Space Center. Fla.
WhiteSandsMissile Range. N. Mex.
Kennedy Space Center, Fla.
Kennedy Space Center, Fla.
Kennedy Space Center. Fla.
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The Little Joe II flights were unmannedballistic flights strictly for command
and service module (CSM)hardware development, mainly of the launch-abort escape
system, separation systems, spacecraft aerodynamics and structural integrity, and
landing systems. The Saturn IB series extendedthese tests to more extreme conditions
(higher entry speeds, higher heatingconditions, longer flight times). Also, the Sat-
urn IB flights begantesting the propulsion and guidanceandcontrol systems, on both
the CSMand the landing module. The SaturnV flights completed the unmannedtest
program, which exercised the CSMat very near the conditions expectedfor a lunar
mission, the major variance being less flight time. By their nature, these missions
required that many special hardware and software elements be developedwhich were
not applicable to the mannedprogram. However, they did aid considerably in the de-
velopment of groundoperational techniques, mission rules, spacecraft checkout, and
launchpreparation.
Manysystems, becauseof their complexity and numerousmodes of operation(electrical power, environmental, computer, communications) could be tested only on
mannedmissions. The number of missions being plannedwas quite large in the early
days of the program, not becauseof the spacecraft test requirements, but becauseof
the uncertainty of success of the developmentprogram, both from the spacecraft and
launch-vehicle standpoint. In late 1963, there were eight Saturn IB andeight Saturn V
developmentmissions scheduledand in the planning stages, and approximately six to
eight more backupmissions in the planning stages.
During the period from late 1967to early 1968, a major redefinition of the devel-
opmentflight program reduced to a minimum the number of developmentflights lead-
ing to the landing mission. After the first two Saturn IB flights, the program hadbeen
reduced to two Saturn IB and seven SaturnV developmentmissions, and only two Sat-
urn IB backup missions were beingplanned. This reduction reflected successeswith
Little Joe II, the two Saturn IB missions, and Saturndevelopmenttests, as well as in-
creased confidencein the system performance and reliability bases on flight and ground
tests. In mid-1968, after the successful unmannedSaturn V missions, a partially suc-
cessful unmannedlunar modulemission, anda successful mannedCSMmission, the
developmentflight test program was reducedto three SaturnV missions with complete
spacecraft: a low-earth-orbit mission (D), a high-ellipse earth-orbit mission (E), and
a lunar-orbit mission (F).
Becauseof the high confidence in the CSM, which was establishedby the early
missions, and becauseof the requirement of additional checkoutand testing of the first
mannedlunar module, it was decidedto fly a CSMalone ona lunar-orbit mission (C).
This mission provided an early evaluation of lunar navigation techniquesand opera-
tional procedures, and addedimmeasurably to the progress and to the eventual success
of the program. It was also decidedat this time to eliminate the high-ellipse earth-
orbit mission (E) in favor of doing tests in the actual lunar environment. Of course,
these extremely complicated E missions completed the necessary testing and develop-
ment of hardware, software and operating techniques, groundcheckout andlaunch prep-
aration, and developmentof mission rules and overall operational capability, except
for the actual lunar landing. This phaseof the mission could be tested only through
the use of the lunar landing training vehicle and by the actual lunar landing.
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MI SSION-PLANNING COORDINATION
Because the development of the Apollo mission plans involved close cooperation
of three widely separated NASA centers, intercenter panels were organized to coordi-
nate all activities in which an interface occurred between the launch vehicle and the
spacecraft. For example, early in the program both the launch vehicle and the space-
craft had development objectives which had to be met with as few flights as possible.
The development of missions which supported adequately the mission objectives of both
launch vehicles and spacecraft took considerable planning effort among the centers.
At the NASA Manned Spacecraft Cen-
ter (MSC), a series of flight operations
plans meetings was conducted to develop
the basic mission plan after the issuance
of requirements. These meetings brought
together the various experts in spacecraft
systems, trajectory analysis, and guid-
ance and control and the flight control-
lers, crew, and flight plan developers
from contractors and MSC organiza-
tions. (See fig. 8-2. ) The chief impor-
tance of these meetings was to set
constraints on the mission.
Mission techniques meetings took
over where the flight operations meetings
left off. The flight operations meetings
led to a definition of the basic mission and
the mission constraints. The detailed op-
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Figure 8-2.- Apollo mission design
instrumentation.
erational procedures for flying the mission were developed in the mission techniques
meetings. The basic mission-planning documents which these working groups influ-
enced were the operational trajectory, the flight plan and procedures, and the mission
rules.
As changes to hardware must be controlled, so must changes to mission plans.
Mission plan changes were controlled by three basic control boards. The Apollo Space-
craft Configuration Control Board (directed by the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft
Program) exerted control over all changes that affected mission objectives, hardware,
trajectories, and propellant requirements. The Software Configuration Control Board
(directed by the Director of Flight Operations) controlled all changes to the onboard
and ground computing programs. The Crew Procedures Configuration Control Board
(directed by the Director of Flight Crew Operations) controlled changes to the mission
flight plan and all operational crew procedures. The Data and Requirements Control
Panel controlled operational data affecting the mission flight plan.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In planning the Apollo missions, much emphasis was placed on the demand for
flexibility in the development program and responsiveness to changing needs. The
dynamic conditions present in Apollo strongly influenced the mission planners in pro-
viding comprehensive alternate mission capability and flexibility in the ground and air-
borne flight software. Probably of more importance, however, was the capacity of the
mission-planning team to react to major program readjustments, as evidenced typi-
cally by the Apollo 8 success. The effectiveness of this team, by using the process
described here, is measured by the Apollo record.
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